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Introduction
In recent years, scholars and advocates committed to the cause of international
legality have almost uniformly expressed passionate enthusiasm for the burgeoning
project of international criminal justice. In the international law literature, the word
"impunity" appears exclusively as a pejorative (if not an epithet),' and scholarship
* Associate Professor of Political Science & Law, Wayne State University. J.D., Harvard
University, 1987; LL.M., Columbia University, 1992; Ph.D., University of California,
Berkeley, 1996. The author wishes to thank James Chalmers, Anthony Colangelo, Anthony
Dillof, Wolfgang Kaleck, Jamie Mayerfeld, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Mark J. Osiel, Darryl
Robinson, Beth Van Schaack, Vincent Wellman, and Gadi Zohar for their helpful
comments.
1. Illustrative is the response of six human rights organizations to Belgium's 2003 curtailment
of the reach of its penal laws: 'With its universal jurisdiction law, Belgium helped destroy
the wall of impunity behind which the world's tyrants had always hidden to shield
themselves from justice,' said the groups. 'It is regrettable that Belgium has now forgotten
the victims to whom it gave a hope of justice."' Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Universal
Jurisdiction Law Repealed, Aug. 1, 2003,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/08/0 1/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed.
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frequently suggests creative circumventions of constraints on penal accountability
that arise from a range of doctrines rooted in deference to state authority. State
sovereignty is routinely cast as a realm of lawlessness that recedes insofar as
international law advances, and nothing is seen to augur the advent of the
international rule of law quite as much as extraterritorial prosecution of state
agents for human rights and humanitarian law violations.
Although the prevalent mind-set allows for controversies internal to criminal
law doctrine, such as about expansive theories of what counts as personal
participation in established international crimes,2 an insistence on discerning, let
alone advocating, public international law-based limitations to the reach of
substantive penal norms encounters profound disfavor. 3 Emblematic is the uni-
So strong is the perceived repugnance of the term that the International Court of Justice felt
the need to give rhetorical assurance that immunity does not equate to impunity, even in
dicta that seemingly bolstered impunity by negative implication. Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg. (Yerodia)), 2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 60 [hereinafter Yerodia].
This curious passage spoke of Foreign Ministers remaining subject to prosecution in
foreign-state courts, after leaving office, for crimes that they committed "in a private
capacity," id. para. 61, even though private crimes in this context are obviously not of
central concern, and continued immunity for crimes committed in a public capacity would
amount to impunity. See id. para. 36 (Van den Wyngaert, J., dissenting); WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 159 & n. 31, (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (concluding that
this language "largely overturned a somewhat more liberal ruling by the United Kingdom
House of Lords in the celebrated Pinochet case"); David S. Koller, Immunities of Foreign
Ministers: Paragraph 61 of the Yerodia Judgment as it Pertains to the Security Council and
the International Criminal Court, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 7, 29 (2004) ("The Court's
judgment effectively creates a substantive defense, according absolute impunity in violation
of . . . the Court's own stated goal of not equating immunity with impunity."). The
passage's substantive significance is doubtful (the "private capacity" language may have
been intended to leave other immunity questions open), but the rhetorical incongruity is
remarkable.
2. Perhaps the most sweeping critique along these lines is Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis
ofInternational Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 925 (2008); see also Alison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75
(2005); Mark J. Osiel, Modes of Participation in Mass Atrocity, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J.
793 (2005).
3. Some noteworthy exceptions include Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal
Jurisdiction - Or Is It Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 199, (2004) (giving a
mixed account of the doctrine's prospects); Madeline Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a
Divided World, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337 (2001) (raising concerns); see also Anthony
Colangelo, The Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2005) (specifying the
scope of the license that universal jurisdiction establishes). The most cited contrarian
literature about international criminal justice comes from outside of the international law
field, whether from the "New Sovereigntist" school within U.S. foreign relations law, see
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directional "Princeton Principles" project: in setting forth prescriptions to expand
national courts' exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction, the proclamation
pointedly cautions that these prescriptions "shall not be construed as limiting the
continued development of universal jurisdiction in international law."4 Where
international criminal justice is concerned, the preponderant view holds, more is
better.5
Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets,
79 FOREIGN AFF. 9 (2000), or from political scientists of the "realist" school, see, e.g., Jack
Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice, 28:3 INT'L SEC. 5 (2003-04); Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of
Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 86 (2001).
4. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 35, Principle 13(3) (Princeton
Univ. Program in Law and Public Affairs, 2001). The official Commentary attributes to the
authors-a well-regarded group of scholars, jurists, and activists-an intention "to invite
rather than hinder the continued development of universal jurisdiction." Id. at 41. Thus,
"[a]ll of the participants felt that the Principles not be construed . . . to constrain the
evolution of accountability for crimes under international law. Id. at 55. However, one of
the participants, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, dissented from the Principles insofar as they
affected states not parties to the Torture Convention or to other instruments manifesting
consent to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, and also inasmuch as the Principles would
remove all immunities, ratione personae as well as ratione materiae. He commented as
follows:
[T]he Princeton Principles propose that individual national courts should exercise such
jurisdiction against nationals of a state which has not agreed to such jurisdiction.
Moreover the Principles do not recognize any form of sovereign immunity: Principle
5(1). If the law were to be so established, states antipathetic to Western powers would be
likely to seize both active and retired officials and military personnel of such Western
powers and stage a show trial for alleged international crimes. Conversely, zealots in
Western States might launch prosecutions against, for example, Islamic extremists for
their terrorist activities. It is naive to think that, in such cases, the national state of the
accused would stand by and watch the trial proceed: resort to force would be more
probable. In any event the fear of such legal actions would inhibit the use of
peacekeeping forces when it is otherwise desirable and also the free interchange of
diplomatic personnel.
I believe that the adoption of such universal jurisdiction without preserving the existing
concepts of immunity would be more likely to damage than to advance chances of
international peace.
Id. at 49, n.20.
5. See, e.g., Mark A. Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of
State Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States that are Not
Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 463
(2006); Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of
Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409 (2000);
Jordan J. Paust, It's No Defense: Nullum Crimen, International Crime and the Gingerbread
Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657 (1997).
As to its particulars, this literature is generally accurate and well-considered. But
paradoxically, a distortion arises from the literature's predominant, and quite appropriate,
focus on relatively uncontroversial cases of mass atrocities. Such contexts inspire fully
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In contrast, the present article will identify and defend those aspects of the
international legal order that persist in impeding the reach of penal accountability.
Rather than regarding these legal impediments as artifacts of the past, to be
progressively overcome by the forces of enlightenment, or as stubborn political
realities that represent the regrettable limits of righteousness in a world still
dominated by self-interested power holders, this article will affirmatively
champion those impediments as matters of principle, to be upheld-at least
presumptively-even in the face of morally compelling causes.
What, besides the purest misanthropy, could account for an approach to
international law that not only acknowledges, but seeks to solidify, restraints on the
pursuit of individual accountability for states' unjust and unlawful acts? The
approach might appear even more curious where the author affirms that law is not
reducible to a set of social facts, as some versions of legal positivism would have
it, but is, rather, a purposive process in which moral considerations play a
legitimate role. 6 It may be more curious still, when the author further admits that
accountability in the exercise of state power counts among legality's foremost
justifiable efforts to overcome doctrinal obstacles to the assertion of prosecutorial authority
over sovereign acts. However, those efforts tend not only to narrow the interpretation of
legal limitations on the redress of injustice, but also to disparage those limitations. See, e.g.,
Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 421 ("The ICC reminds governments that real politik, which
sacrifices justice at the altar of political settlements, is no longer accepted.") In particular,
the anti-impunity rhetoric tends to imply broadly that state officials who authorize or
participate in their states' violation of international legal obligations---especially human
rights obligations-can be held personally accountable in foreign courts. As will be
discussed below, this is the exception, not the rule, and remains so for sound reasons of
principle and policy.
6. The methodological approach taken here, inspired significantly by the work of Lon Fuller
and Ronald Dworkin, is less akin to positivism (see Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus,
The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A
Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (1999)) than to the "new international legal process"
theory, inasmuch as the latter considers "legal doctrine in light of the law's purposes and
the polity's underlying principles." See Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International Legal
Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 334, 336 (1999) (citing the canonical work of Henry M. Hart,
Jr. and Albert Sacks). Yet in O'Connell's reading, the latter theory "not only supports the
fullest accountability, but also would give international institutions the authority to decide
for full accountability, despite contrary indications in positive international law." Id at 351.
1 find this statement unexceptionable as applied to the uncontroversially atrocious cases on
which she focuses, but troubling in its neglect of the countervailing purposes and principles
that would properly preclude extraterritorial penal accountability in other cases.
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inherent purposes, and that unlawful state acts are "committed by men, not by
abstract entities."
7
The explanation for the contrarian approach lies in the purposes of global order
given pride of place in the United Nations Charter: the establishment of a platform
for peaceful accommodation among states, representing a diversity of interests and
values, and the protection of weak political communities from overbearing
projections of power by strong foreign states. 8 These purposes underlie what
remains the primary organizing principle of the Charter-based order: the sovereign
equality of states. An unbalanced pursuit of other purposes, morally compelling
though they may be, would jeopardize that order's accomplishments, which are
themselves morally compelling.
9
To champion the purposes associated with sovereign equality is by no means to
deny that international criminal justice can serve a useful-indeed, often
complementary-function. Nor can there be any doubt that, as a result of the
international community's practical and rhetorical affirmations of this function,
penal norms have, in recent decades, developed substantially within the corpus of
positive international law. 10 Not only has the international system produced
institutional apparatuses of its own to implement these norms, but it has
increasingly "deputized" individual states to establish extraterritorial prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction over the most serious violations of human rights and
humanitarian law."
7. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentence (Oct. 1, 1946), 41
AM. J. INT'L L. 172,221 (1947).
8. The first two "Purposes" of the Organization listed in article 1 are "To maintain
international peace and security" and "To develop friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." U.N. Charter
arts. 1(1), 1(2). Consequently, "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members," id. art. 2(1), and all states are bound to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state," id art. 2(4). These purposes are given forceful and
authoritative elaboration in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].
9. "If modern international society was instituted for anything, it was to prevent unnecessary
confrontations and collisions between different states that are inspired and driven by the
assertion of their own preferred values." ROBERT JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT:
HUMAN CONDUCT IN A WORLD OF STATES 368 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
10. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3-199 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2003).
11. See id. at 284-98; UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION
OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen Macedo ed., Univ. of Pa. Press
2004).
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The real issues lie at the margins. Where existing positive norms of the
international legal order that emphasize state authority-in particular,
jurisdictional limitations, immunities, and nullum crimen sine lege-threaten to
frustrate prosecutions of human rights violators, to what extent should interpretive
creativity be brought to bear to fill gaps and to overcome barriers in the name of
moral purposes? This article will argue that, especially where domestic courts
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign state agents, such interpretive
creativity should ordinarily be resisted. Such resistance reflects, not a sterile
formalism, but an affirmation that the doctrinal constraints at issue are central to
the international legal order's moral project.
The first section below will summarize the challenge that the prevalence of
ruthless responses to political crisis poses to a legal order that demands both
human rights compliance and forbearance from unilateral impositions. The second
section will elaborate rule-of-law considerations that constrain the retrospective
application of one regime's criminal law to conduct that took place under a
different regime. The third section will speak to the special problem of observing
the rule of law in accounting for enactments of past regimes that systematized
extreme injustice. The fourth section will argue for regarding international law as a
worthy constraint on the pursuit of substantive justice. The fifth section will
contend that the distinction between international human rights violations and
international crimes needs to be rigorously observed rather than elided.
I. Championing Legality in a Ruthless World
Substantive justice and the rule of law represent distinct moral projects that,
while often in harmony, are sometimes in tension. 12 The rule of law, presupposing
human societies beset by both conflict of interest and moral disagreement,
establishes rigidities designed to promote predictability and accountability in the
exercise of power. Where legal constraint lacks sufficient rigidity to withstand the
pressing demands of substantive justice, especially in a "horizontal" system that
relies on the more powerful states for coercive norm implementation, the strong
are unleashed to pursue substantive justice as they understand it.
Working relationships in the international arena largely depend on maintaining
an "agreement to disagree," not only about conflicts of interest, but also about
12. See, e.g., Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 186
(1982) (noting the conflict between one party's "right to a better public order" and another's
"right to a consistent application of the public order").
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matters of fundamental justice. The international legal order thus needs to maintain
a balance between ideological pluralism-accommodating inconsistent and
sometimes mutually antagonistic political moralities-and an insistence on the
inadmissibility of practices reprehended by an overlapping consensus of disparate
conceptions of justice.
Moreover, as will be elaborated more fully below, international law's
constraints on cross-border exercises of coercion and force are founded exclusively
on respect for the sovereign authority of individual states. Where international law
is seen to impugn that sovereign authority, and yet recourse to the trumping
authority of the United Nations Security Council is unavailing (as is usual, given
that body's prevalent disunity), the commitment to forbearance from self-help is
inevitably strained. It is unrealistic to expect international law's insistence on the
inviolability of a state's territorial integrity and political independence to be
heeded, where international law itself is enlisted in the project of branding that
state's government as criminal.
13
In international criminal law, the consideration of ideological pluralism weighs
most heavily in domestic court cases proceeding under the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction. Unilateral assertions of extraterritorial penal jurisdiction over acts of
foreign state agents are the most likely to pose a danger to the balance that
international law represents, 14 thereby undermining the international legal order's
indispensable functions of facilitating accommodation and precluding the strong
from imposing what they unilaterally perceive as justice.
The most serious problem promises to arise in the application of putative
international penal norms to cases of what I will call "ruthlessness": measures
13. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 875 (1990) (justifying "unilateral vindication of
clear violations of rights when multilateral possibilities do not obtain" on the ground that
"rights without remedies are not rights at all"); Reisman, Unilateral Actions and the
Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian
Intervention, 11 EURO. J. INT'L L. 3, 15 (2000) [hereinafter Reisman, Unilateral Actions]
(contending that "as the norms in question-international human rights norms-derive from
a broader decision process than the body assigned to enforce those norms, the broader
decision process sustains the norms and seeks alternative modes of enforcement.").
14. "Unfortunately, considering the enormous effort and potential expense in collecting
evidence, gathering witnesses, and trying accused perpetrators of horrific crimes committed
extraterritorially, the motivation for almost every such national proceeding likely would
have some foundation in politics or arise from a sense of judicial, and most likely Western,
superiority." Anthony Sammons, The "'Under-Theorization" of Universal Jurisdiction:
Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 111, 137-38 (2003).
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incompatible with "universal" principles of deontological morality,15 and
condemned widely in the abstract, but evaluated differentially in practice within
the empirical international community, on the basis of differential regard for the
ends to which these measures serve as a means. These ruthless measures constitute
serious human rights violations, and some of them have been unambiguously
criminalized. Many of them, however, are either (a) outside the scope of
established international crimes, 16 (b) on the margins of established international
crimes, 17 or (c) nominally within the scope of existing international crimes, but not
really treated as international crimes when the "good guys" are the ones
committing them.'
8
Whereas the elements of the most uncontroversial international crimes
themselves entail or suggest inadmissible ends, 19 ruthless measures, as herein
15. For an introduction to the distinction between deontological and consequentialist
approaches to morality, see for example, J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND
WRONG 149-168 (John Leslie ed., Penguin Books Ltd. 1977).
16. For example, as will be discussed at length below, the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention], confers
extraterritorial penal jurisdiction over acts of "torture" as defined in article 1, but not over
"cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" as defined in article 16.
17. For example, article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
codifies the customary war crime of "intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge
that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute of the ICC] (entered into force July 1,
2002). The uncertainty of this norm's application to frequent occurrences in the course of
armed conflicts is manifest. See Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law:
What's the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 809, 883 (2005) (expressing concern that
"these exceedingly vague concepts are likely to result in outcomes determined more by
power politics and contested normative views than legal considerations in many cases").
18. The much-maligned tu quoque defense has considerable force where a standard's legal
validity ultimately rests on its manifestation in patterns of actual practice. Even at
Nuremberg, German Admiral Karl Doenitz was successfully defended on the count of
engaging in unrestricted submarine warfare on the basis of an affidavit from U.S. Admiral
Chester Nimitz, who averred that he had done the same against the Japanese. See Gerry J.
Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALBANY L. REV. 801,
806 n. 26 (1997). For an allegation of double-standards in the operation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, see Paulo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor
and the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (2001).
19. These include genocide (an effort "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group"), crimes against humanity (a "widespread or systematic attack ...
against [a] civilian population"), and "a plan or policy or... a large-scale commission" of
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defined, are substantially related to cognizable governmental (or insurgent)
objectives.2 0 Although presumptively wrongful in both moral and legal terms, they
can be differentiated from three other categories of acts: (i) acts that represent
essentially private indulgences of sadism or venality under color of governmental
authority; (ii) acts in explicit or implicit furtherance of a governmental purpose that
is ruled out by the fundamental principles of the international legal order (e.g.,
genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing); and (iii) acts in furtherance
of a governmental purpose less extreme, but so manifestly illegitimate that the
authorities do not even assert it to justify themselves (instead relying, for example,
on factual denials).'
As distinguished from the genuine consensus that can be found to condemn
wanton cruelty, genocidal policy, and manifest cynicism, the seeming universal
reprehension of ruthless measures frequently turns out, on close examination, to be
illusory. Affirmations of the acts' "inherent" wrongfulness often obscure deep
disagreement about whether such measures could be justified in the service of what
might appear-from some political or ideological standpoints, but not others-to
be compelling societal needs.22
grave breaches or other serious violations of the laws of war." Rome Statute of the ICC,
supra note 17, arts. 6, 7, and 8.
20. For an elaboration on this distinction, see Brad R. Roth, Just Short of Torture: Abusive
Treatment and the Limits of International Criminal Justice, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 215,
227-30 (2008).
21. As Philip Soper points out, what distinguishes the objectively unjust state from "the
gunman writ large" is the former's claim to be acting justly. Philip Soper, In Defense of
Classical Natural Law Theory: Why Unjust Law is No Law at All, 20 CANADIAN J. L. &
JURISP. 201, 212 (2007). Where state agents manifestly lack a good faith belief that they are
acting in the public interest, the international system's respect for state authority properly
offers them little shelter. Similarly, little shelter can be found where the motivating
conception of the public interest, even if bonafide, contradicts the principle of "equal rights
and self-determination of peoples" upon which the international system's respect for state
authority is predicated. See U.N. Charter, prmbl., arts. 1, para. (2), art. 2, para. (1); see also
DJURA NINdI(t, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 256-58 (Martinus Hijhoff, 1970) (presenting the Charter's
sovereignty and self-determination norms as intertwined).
22. Opinion polls consistently demonstrate this phenomenon in regard to coercive interrogation
tactics, even when they may constitute torture. See, e.g., Associated Press, Poll Finds Broad
Approval of Terrorist Torture: Most in US., Britain, France, S. Korea Say Torture Justified
in Rare Instances, (Dec. 9, 2005, ), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10345320// ("In
America, 61 percent of those surveyed agreed torture is justified at least on rare occasions.
Almost nine in 10 in South Korea and just over half in France and Britain felt that way.").
For a deeply reasoned, if problematic, defense of the use of torture in the interrogation of a
sub-class of terrorism suspects, see Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive
Interrogation be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 671 (2006); but see Christopher Kutz, Torture,
Necessity, and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 263 (2007) (arguing that "the
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Ruthless measures are not the exception in violent political conflict; in the best
of circumstances, they are the rule, whereas in the worst, they give way to
unrestrained brutality.23 The morally better sides in such conflicts appear to have
abstained from ruthlessness only to the extent that their histories have been
successfully whitewashed. 24 Complicity in ruthlessness has been endemic in liberal
as well as non-liberal societies; 25 supporters of forcible measures have either
known, or known that they did not want to know,26 that those measures were
inflicting and would further inflict egregious suffering on the innocent. Supporters
have persisted in giving aid and comfort to the perpetrators of such measures in the
defense of necessity runs out when it confronts pre-institutional rights, whose value is not a
product of an instrumental calculus").
23. Robert S. McNamara's recent introspections have drawn attention to grisly Allied measures
in World War II that decent liberal-democratic states (and the bulk of their populations)
have never repudiated:
We burned to death 100,000 Japanese civilians in Tokyo -- men, women, and children...
Lemay said, "If we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals." And
I think he's right. He-and I'd say I-were behaving as war criminals... What makes it
immoral if you lose, and not immoral if you win?
Samantha Power, War and Never Having to Say You're Sorry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003,
§ 2, 1,at33.
24. As John T. Parry points out, although torture is frequently said to be at odds with U.S.
historical practice, the opposite is true. See John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97
GEO. L.J. 1001, 1003, 1011-16 (2009) (noting systematic U.S. involvement, direct and
indirect, in torture during counterinsurgent campaigns in Vietnam and Latin America).
25. The mainstream discourse remains far from coming to grips with the record of gross and
systematic abuses that the U.S. committed directly in Korea and Vietnam, see BRUCE
CUMINGS, THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, VOL. II 753 (Princeton Univ. Press 1990)
(attributing hundreds of thousands of North Korean civilian deaths to U.S. strategic
bombing); MICHAEL BILTON & KEVtN SIM, FOUR HOURS IN MY LAI: A WAR CRIME AND
ITS AFTERMATH (Viking 1992) (detailing the systematic nature of the violence that U.S.
forces perpetrated against civilians in Vietnam), and by proxy in other Cold War-era
conflicts, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER (Verso
Books 2001); RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT: U.S. POLICY AND EL
SALVADOR (Times Books 1984). But a sweeping characterization of U.S. Cold War policy
makers as international criminals would miss the point: hardly anyone who had a role (or,
for that matter, a rooting interest) on any side of any of these conflicts is entitled to engage
in flights of deontological self-righteousness.
26. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Detainee Shell Game, WASH. POST, May 31, 2009, available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR 20 0 9 05 2 9 02 9 8 9 .ht
ml?hpid=opinionsboxl (arguing that seemingly more scrupulous detention policies merely
end up restoring traditional U.S. reliance on "intelligence services from countries that have
poor human rights records," so that "in many respects all we are really doing is driving the
terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated
worse," while allowing us to "feel better about ourselves.").
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belief-right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable-that the end justified the
means.
It is in such cases that the international order's pluralism is most consequential.
Unilateral invocations of universal justice, absent adequate positivistic
substantiation, ring hollow where assessments of guilt depend on the political
sympathies prevalent in the venue. 7 As will be contended below, such invocations
pose a threat both to the integrity of international criminal justice and to the
broader project of international legal order.
Accordingly, this article will make the case that international criminal law
should eschew appeals to supra-positive moral considerations that would, without
benefit of a demonstrable consensus, extend the penal law's reach in derogation of
existing legal limitations. Where the purported norms providing for the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, for the invalidation of immunity, or for the criminality
of a government-authorized act at the time and place in question cannot by credible
methods be attributed (directly or indirectly) to the affirmations of the relevant
sovereign states, and where the effort to fill the gap relies on a "universal" abstract
principle that enjoys no actual consensus in application-however lamentably,
from a moral standpoint-the prosecutorial interest must give way.
Whatever merit there may be in deriving non-penal norms from considerations
of natural justice, the legal validity of norms that identify not mere wrongfulness,
but criminality-let alone the extraordinary criminality associated with "enemies
of humanity"28-must depend on acknowledged sources of social authority.
Sweeping appeals to human dignity, however properly invoked in law as a shield,29
are inadmissible as a sword. 30 Even the most egregious moral wrongs are crimes,
27. See Steiner, supra note 3, at 229 ("A political leader or military figure could be understood
or imagined within one state or group as hero, in another as villain, within one state or
group as freedom fighter, in another as terrorist.").
28. Universal jurisdiction is predicated on the idea that certain crimes establish their
perpetrators as "hostis humani generis, an enemy of mankind." Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. In this context, I use the term "shield" to characterize the assertion of a norm to block the
exercise of state power against individuals. Essentially the same assertion, of course, may
afterward operate to extract reparation from the state for a violation, and would thus serve
as a "sword" in the procedural sense, but the latter use can be seen as ancillary to the
former. However, where the norm is invoked to hold individuals personally accountable,
criminally or civilly, for acts that they committed as state agents, it is being used to
authorize an imposition of state power upon them, and thus as a "sword."
30. Beth Van Schaack, though arguing generally to the contrary, concedes that "referring to
extra-textual principles is more palatable with respect to holding states responsible for
breaches than it is for criminally prosecuting individuals where penal sanctions are at
issue." Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of
Law & Morals, 97 GEO. L. J. 119, 149 (2008).
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in the legal sense, only when there is a requisite social, not just a moral, basis for
characterizing them as such. That social basis must be established through
conventionally accepted methods for attributing norms to the will of a political
community that, at the time and place of the conduct, duly exerted authority.
Moreover, where penal norms are applied extraterritorially, especially against
persons operating under the putative authority of their own states, questions of
adjudicative jurisdiction and functional (ratione materiae) immunity pose similar
stakes-the determination on the merits being so heavily dependent on who gets to
say-and must therefore be determined by similarly rigorous standards.
These proposed strictures on international criminal justice are important, not
because any great number of actual prosecutions that have occurred so far have
contravened them, but because they are so sharply at odds with the rhetoric that
has often surrounded those actual prosecutions. The problem here is not so much
that "hard cases make bad law," but rather that extreme cases generate bad dicta.
31
Both judges and commentators, in their exuberance to herald a new day of
individual accountability for human rights abuse, have invoked broad propositions
that, removed from their particular contexts, open the door to exercises of power
incompatible with the international rule of law.32 The goal of a more restrictive
approach is not to stymie international criminal justice, but to render it safe for
international legal order, thereby potentially emboldening otherwise-reluctant
actors to implement it where genuinely appropriate.
31. A prime example of that maxim can be found in the Eichmann decision, which boldly and
quite unnecessarily repudiated nullum crimen sine lege. See Attorney Gen. of the Gov't of
Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277, 282 (Sup. Ct. of Israel, May 29, 1962) ("[I]f it is
the contention of counsel for the appellant that we must apply international law as it is, and
not as it ought to be from a moral point of view, then we must reply precisely from a legal
point of view, no such rule of international law is to be found.").
32. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment, 155-156 (Dec. 10,
1998), http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (asserting in dicta
that a prohibition'sjus cogens character alone implies universal jurisdiction over individual
violators and nullification of a state's authority to immunize or amnesty the conduct); Van
Schaack, supra note 30, at 192 ("International judges, it turns out, are better able to
represent the moral condemnation of the international community than are states engaged in
multilateral negotiations with their own interests-including ensuring impunity-at heart.
And so, where the law was silent, it was made to speak.").
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II. Law and Morality in Retrospective and Extraterritorial
Prosecution
A. Positivism, Naturalism, and the Rule of Law
A pedestrian account of restrictive approaches to extraterritorial and
retrospective penal accountability associates such approaches with legal
positivism, and casts them in opposition to natural-law conceptions of legality. In
the most sweeping and unnuanced formulation, naturalism identifies legality with
immutable and rather wide-ranging principles of substantive justice, the moral
truth of which suffices to establish legal validity, irrespective of any grounding in
effective political authority. 33 Legal positivism, in its most straightforward
formulation, asserts, to the contrary, that legality derives from social facts, not
moral truths, so that an unjust law is law nonetheless.
34
Thus, where violations of human dignity have reflected, rather than
contradicted, the scheme of political authority in effect at the time and place of
their occurrence, the archetypical naturalist would seem more disposed, not only to
find criminality inherent in the acts themselves, 35 but also to find the victims'
humanity as sufficient justification for attributing jurisdiction to prosecutorial
apparatuses lacking otherwise-established authority over the territory or the
perpetrators, 36 and to nullify immunities from jurisdiction that stem from the brute
fact of the perpetrators having committed the acts in service of a foreign state's
sovereign authority over its national territory. The archetypical positivist, to the
contrary, would insist that the immorality of the conduct does not itself provide
33. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s often-repeated quotation from St. Augustine that "an unjust law is
no law at all," Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963), from St.
Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, I, v. 11, appears to say just this, but to invoke it for that
proposition is doubly misleading. First, King was concerned, not with questions of
analytical or normative jurisprudence, but exclusively with those of political obligation;
King was denying only that unjust laws were morally binding on the citizen. Cf. Soper,
supra note 21, at 202 (acknowledging that most theorists now interpret the maxim "as a
claim in political or moral theory, not legal theory"). Second, King was not really calling
for individuals to second-guess the justice of every enactment; he sought disobedience only
to a specific subset of unjust laws, and then only in circumscribed ways. John Finnis has
characterized the maxim as an overdramatization and distortion even of Augustine's actual
meaning. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 363-66 (Clarendon Press
1980).
34. See generally John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5Y, Myths, 46 AM. J. JuRIS. 199 (2001).
35. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 99 (2001).
36. Id. at 101.
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any legal basis for imposing penal accountability, and would set exacting empirical
criteria for establishing the substantive and procedural requisites to prosecution.
37
There is some rudimentary truth in these generalizations, but they obscure, if
not distort, the essence of the matter. For a start, the current state of the field of
analytical jurisprudence does not admit such tidy definitions of "natural law" and
"legal positivism." Each camp is itself divided on the essential meanings of these
terms, and if one goes by some current accounts of the opposing positions, not only
are the differences "normatively inert, 38 but functionally, they have narrowed to
near the vanishing point. The most widely-held natural-law theories acknowledge
that social facts very substantially constrain the project of legal interpretation, 39
and a school of "inclusive legal positivism" allows that a norm's legal validity may
derive from its moral content rather than from its social source, provided that the
given system's established source doctrines authorize juridical recourse to moral
principles.40 The two sides differ as to little more than their formal way of
accounting for exercises of moral and political judgment that both sides accept, not
only as facts of judicial behavior, but as legitimate judicial practice.4
More importantly, the real controversies over retrospective (i.e., post-regime-
change) and extraterritorial penal accountability of state agents turn not on answers
to the formal question of "what is law?" but on answers to questions of political
morality that are begged by terms such as "the rule of law" and "nullum crimen
37. Id. at 99.
38. Gardner, supra note 34, at 202; see also Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate:
The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence 18(U. Tex. Law, Public Law Research Paper
No. 34, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-312781.
39. See Soper, supra note 21, at 205; Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA.
L. REv. 165, 169 (1982); see generally Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE (Harvard Univ.
Press 1986). Dworkin's view has been aptly described as a third theory of law, intermediate
between naturalism and positivism. John Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7:1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 4 (1977); see also Soper, supra note 21, at 206. The same can be said of Lon
Fuller's approach, which identifies law with a set of procedural requisites (law's "internal
morality") rather than with conformity to a substantive conception of justice. See LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed., Yale University Press 1969) (1964).
40. See Gardner, supra note 34, at 201; Mackie, supra note 39, at 5-6; Scott J. Shapiro, The
"Hart-Dworkin" Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed 22-26, (U. MICH., Public Law
Working Paper No. 77, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=968657.
41. See Soper, supra note 21, at 202. This is not to deny that the different approaches affect, in
a more subtle way, whether and how judges confront substantive injustice. See Mark J.
Osiel, Dialogue with Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil, 20 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 481 (1995).
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sine lege." Whether a practice is consistent with either of these principles depends
on the animating purposes that one attributes to legal order.
According to Lon Fuller, law's "internal morality" requires that enactments be
general, well-publicized, prospective, clear, not contradictory of other laws,
susceptible of compliance, stable, and enforced in a manner congruent with their
42declaration. But Fuller did not regard compliance with each of these criteria of
legality as a necessary condition for calling an enactment a "law." Indeed,
in England and America, it would never occur to anyone to say that "it is in the nature of
law that it cannot be retroactive," although, of course, constitutional inhibitions may
prohibit certain kinds of retroactivity... [T]here would be a certain occult
unpersuasiveness in any assertion that retroactivity violates the very nature of law itself.
Yet we have only to imagine a country in which all laws are retroactive in order to see that
retroactivity presents a real problem for the internal morality of law.. .A general increase
in the resort to statutes curative of past legal irregularities represents a deterioration in that
form of legal morality without which law itself cannot exist.
43
The real question, then, is not whether a given enactment counts as "law," but
whether, on the basis of a broader normative assessment, "the rule of law" is
prevalent in the society in question, or whether a particular measure, in its overall
context, enhances or diminishes that prevalence. 44
Fuller identified "the basic difference between law and managerial direction" as
follows:
[L]aw is not, like management, a matter of directing other persons how to accomplish
tasks set by a superior, but is basically a matter of providing the citizenry with a sound and
stable framework for their interactions with one another, the role of government being that
of standing as a guardian of the integrity of this system.
45
To paraphrase, what essentially distinguishes legality from its opposite-from
what Locke referred to as "rule by extemporary arbitrary decree"46-is an overall
orientation toward predictability and accountability in the exercise of power.
42. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 39, at 46-91.
43. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law.: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 650-51 (1958). The article was Fuller's famous response to H.L.A. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
44. Although his chief antagonist, the legal positivist H.L.A. Hart, insisted that the principles of
"legality" and "the rule of law" were distinct from "law" as such, Hart's understanding of
the former was essentially identical to Fuller's. See Jeremy Waldron, Hart's Equivocal
Response to Fuller, at 114 (2008),
www.law.nyu.edu/idcplg?IdcService=GETFILE&dDocName=ECMDLV_016303&Revi
sionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (citing H.L.A. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of
Law, reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 114 (1983)).
45. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 39, at 210.
46. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 11, § 136 (The Liberal Arts Press
1952) (1690) ("The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to
8 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1(2010)
Predictability and accountability in the exercise of power are inherent in the
project of legality for at least two reasons. First, virtually all invocations of the
word "law" implicitly trade on this orientation. To use the word to describe an
ordering process with the opposite orientation would violate conventional
, . 47
understandings of the language and thereby confuse one's audience.
Second, predictability and accountability in the exercise of power are necessary,
though not sufficient, conditions for the achievement of the most foundational ends
associated with liberal-democratic political traditions. Predictability and
accountability are, analogous to Rawls's notion of a primary good,48 what
everyone wants, regardless of what else anyone wants-insofar as "everyone,"
even if not a liberal or a democrat, shares those traditions' most rudimentary
concerns. The first of these is that individuals have the basic capacity to organize
their lives49 with the security that everything that is not knowably prohibited is
rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights
of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges; for the law of
nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who
through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of
their mistake where there is no established judge; and so it serves not, as it ought, to
determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where
every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case .... ").
47. Jeremy Waldron reveals the point vividly as follows:
A word like "hospital" provides a good analogy. One of the meanings given for hospital
in the Oxford English Dictionary is "[a]ny institution or establishment for the care of the
sick or wounded, or of those who require medical treatment." [citation omitted]. No one
understands the term "hospital" unless he understands what hospitals arefor. To describe
one's establishment as a hospital is to hold out the promise of healing and care-even
though it might turn out that the procedures actually used in a given institution making
this promise are in fact harmful or hurtful to the patients. Now, if their harmfulness or
hurtfulness is known and intended, that belies the sincerity of the description; we assume
that Dr. Mengele is being ironic when he talks about his clinic at Auschwitz as a
"hospital." But we do not withdraw the term the instant harmfulness is discovered if we
are sure that the institution in question has the treatment of the sick and the wounded as
its aim. So this is a case in which the analytic separability of "hospital" and "actual non-
harmfulness" conceals a deeper aspirational connection between the two.
Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (2001).
Waldron goes on to concede that "the promise of justice is not conveyed semantically by
the word 'law,"' id. at 766-67, but that concession seems undue in regard to the more
modest promise of an orientation toward predictability and accountability in the exercise of
power.
48. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
49. As Isaiah Berlin put it, "a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of
public authority." Reasonable persons may well differ over the placement of the
demarcation line, but liberty can be understood only as "the absence of interference beyond
the shifting, but always recognizable, frontier." Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
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permitted, so that they need neither to live in terror of sudden impositions and
unexpected punishments, nor to secure protection by "getting in good" with
dominant officials, subordinating themselves to the latter's will. 50 The second
concern is that, regardless of what counts as legitimate authority in a society, the
implementers of that authority-who may be untrusted, untrustworthy, or both-
effectively be subjected in their purported implementation to fixed and knowable
standards.
To be sure, some political orders, supported by bona fide (though typically
hideous) political moralities, reject these concerns on principle. 51 Totalitarian
orders (in the true sense associated with Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot) seek to mold,
not to accommodate, individual will, and while they may use legal forms to hold
lower officials accountable to higher ones, they have often, in practice, been
satisfied if lower officials, irrespective of abuses in their exercise of delegated
authority, demonstrate personal loyalty to the upper leadership. It thus would be a
mistake to characterize predictability and accountability in the exercise of power as
empirically universal concerns. Still, it may be fair to say that the exceptions are
normatively uninteresting.
A more significant proviso is that even where predictability and accountability
are core concerns of political morality, they do not have the field to themselves.
There are other concerns that may, in particular circumstances, be found
legitimately to be in tension with those values. One could not justifiably say that
legality is absent wherever those latter concerns, such as the need for flexible
response to emergency, prevail.
"The rule of law" might best be summarized as the principle that "There shall
be no exercise of power, except according to law." But even were there an
uncontroverted and unambiguous understanding of what counts as "law" in this
context, consensus on the principle would scarcely be any the nearer.
First, one would need to specify what counts as an exercise of power. Although
the present topic, prosecution, raises no problems in this area, it is worth noting
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 124-27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1969). However
small the space is behind that boundary, it is in that space that the individual can pursue
interests and ends without regard to the preferences of state officials or others in society.
Nullum crimen gives individuals the confidence to act freely right up to the boundary,
including to "hide behind technicalities" that permit behavior that some might find contrary
to "the spirit" of the law.
50. See Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 633, 642-43 (1990).
51. See INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1991); HAROLD J. BERMAN,
JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW (rev. ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1963).
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that a formal devolution of authority to private actors to take decisions affecting
the conditions of social life cannot properly withdraw such decisions from the
subject matter, since the scope of the latter is defined not by formal categories, but
by underlying substantive concerns.
Second, and most daunting, one would need to determine the meaning of
"according to." At one (impossible) extreme, this might mean "as dictated by": the
complete abolition of executive discretion. At the other (all too possible) extreme,
it might mean "as authorized by," so as to be satisfied merely by an all-
encompassing legislative delegation of authority to the executive organ (as in a
Reichstag conferral of "all power to the Ftihrer"). 52 Law always and necessarily
licenses discretionary authority;53 "the rule of law" is achieved when law sets
boundaries to such discretion that are meaningful and reasonable, given the proper
ends of governance.5 4 But this is quintessentially a normative question, and minds
will differ widely on the requisite nature and extent of those boundaries; there is no
formal standard that could conceivably resolve the controversy.
Third, one would need to determine whether any society is serious-or can
afford to be serious-about the "No," the absolute claim for the illegitimacy of
extralegal authority. A rule-of-law-oriented domestic political order tends to
characterize the political entity's sovereignty as constituted by the order's legal
norms, but as Carl Schmitt notoriously suggested (and as even such founders of the
liberal ethos as Locke understood), 55 this is a troubled claim. An existential threat
52. See H.W. KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK: POLITICAL JUSTICE IN HITLER'S GERMANY
113-14 (I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd 1989) (detailing the Reichstag session of April 26, 1942).
53. See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE
L.J. 1198, 1224 (1983) ("There is a law of conservation of discretion: one limits the
discretion of one set of actors only by increasing that of others.").
54. Martin Krygier refers to "a society where law counts in public life." Krygier, supra note 50,
at 644.
55. See John Locke on prerogative power:
This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of
the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative: for since in
some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too
numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is
impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that
may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed
with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their
way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice
which the laws do not prescribe. (emphasis added).
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 14, $ 160 (1690).
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to the political order itself tends to reveal a residual constituent authority that
withstands constituted order and (arguably) licenses extra-constitutional
discretion.56 The foundational Schmittian insight is that whereas norms govern in
normal times, they give way in exceptional times; "sovereign is he who decides on
the exception," and sovereignty is the power to suspend valid law. 57 (One can
accept this conceptual point without in any way endorsing Schmitt's own
applications of it.)58
Thus, invocations of the rule of law necessarily raise more questions than they
answer. The concept is open-textured. Formal, analytic means cannot yield
determinate judgments about whether a particular measure furthers or diminishes
the phenomenon's prevalence, as such judgments necessarily reflect a weighing of
the range of competing normative considerations that espousal of the principle
does not preclude.
B. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
Still, the sub-principle of nullum crimen sine lege lies at the core, rather than the
periphery, of the rule of law. Criminal prosecutions are exercises of power not
merely tolerated by law, but undertaken in the name of law. Whereas, for example,
in time of war, legality may abide preventive detention measures, to be imposed
temporarily on real and suspected enemies with relatively limited procedural
safeguards and relatively low substantive thresholds, legality can never abide
unjust convictions. 59 Undue criminal conviction differs qualitatively from other
See also Clement Fatovic, Emergency Action as Jurisprudential Miracle: Liberalism 's
Political Theology of Prerogative, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 487, 491-94 (2008) (comparing and
contrasting Locke and Schmitt on this point).
56. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIvY bk. I, ch. 34 (1517) available at
http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy1.htm#1:34 (favoring the institution of
"dictatorship," or emergency rule, on the ground that "when a similar method is lacking in a
Republic, either observing the institutions (strictly) will ruin her, or in order not to ruin her,
it will be necessary to break them").
57. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5, 9 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2005).
58. Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aoldin explain the perniciousness of Schmitt's solution to the
conundrum as follows: "The dictator's unlimited powers are exercisable in the context of
the extreme case-i.e., the exception. However, the only logical outcome of Schmitt's
collapsing together the power to decide the existence of the exception and the breadth of
counter-emergency powers to be used in order to bring the exception to a conclusion, and
depositing them both in the hands of one person-the sovereign dictator-is that the
dictator's unlimited powers are never turned off." OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN,
LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 165
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
59. Thus, the Geneva Conventions, which barely regulate long-term detention for substantial
categories of persons, especially in non-international armed conflict, establish a universally
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wrongful impositions, as it heaps insult upon injury; rather than treating the person
as an adversary or even as a mere object, wrongful criminal conviction, in trading
on legality, inflicts obloquy with the pretense of objectivity and fairness.
Moreover, in appropriating the symbols of legality for that purpose, distorted penal
processes degrade the legitimating value of legal forms.
Violations of nullum crimen sine lege are quintessential abuses of legality
because they so frontally defy the concern for predictability and accountability in
the exercise of power. The former concern corresponds to the familiar "notice"
aspect of nullum crimen sine lege. Much of the debate about retrospective and
extraterritorial prosecution goes to this aspect, with pro-prosecutorial arguments
drawing on alternative sources of notice, such as natural justice or international
treaty commitments unincorporated into domestic law, to overcome the limits of
positivistic sources of law authoritative at the time and place of the act.60 Such
prosecutorial strategies are often questionable in their own terms, especially given
that the existence of contradictory positive law typically reflects difference of
opinion over what counts as natural justice, and that notice of an international legal
obligation, without more, in no way implies notice that state authorization in
contradiction to the obligation will be treated as legally null and void.61
applicable prohibition on "The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); see also Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of International
Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I of 1977]
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("It would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or
insist that each specific military command in an area of probable operations will conform to
conventional tests of constitutionality.. .But if we cannot confine military expedients by the
Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may
deem expedient.").
60. See Van Schaack, supra note 30, at 156.
61. In the U.S., for example, a "controlling executive act" is given legal effect even where it
violates customary international law, see, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th
Cir. 1986); Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States
Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986), and
statutes prevail over prior treaty commitments, The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-
99 (1884). Moreover, "while treaties 'may comprise international commitments ... they are
not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty
itself conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is ratified on these terms."'
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008); see also Charlie Savage, Videos ShedNew
Light on Sotomayor's Positions, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, available at
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It is important to add, however, that nullum crimen sine lege is not reducible to
the problem of notice. It is equally a problem of legislative and adjudicative
institutions exceeding their legal authority in establishing an act's wrongfulness. A
person might know that her act is condemned as criminal by some insurgent
movement or hostile foreign government. She might equally know that there is a
considerable chance that she will be on the losing side of the political struggle, and
face prosecution for the act that she commits within the authorization of the
currently recognized regime. Such facts fall far short of curing the nullum crimen
sine lege problem.62 No basis for a criminal conviction can be found in the
articulations, however morally enlightened or predictably efficacious, of an
institution that lacked authority to resolve the question of the act's criminality for
the time and place that the act was committed.
Where the international legal order had recognized the government and had
omitted (so far) to establish the conduct as an international crime, thereby
acknowledging state authority over individuals' conduct at the time and place in
question, that order is estopped to criminalize, or to abide criminalization of,
reliance on such state authority. To be sure, the international legal order establishes
equal respect, not for governmental apparatuses as such, but for the underlying
political communities. Yet those apparatuses serve as the communities'
indispensable instruments for the coordination of activities establishing the
conditions of social life. Members of the communities thus have good reason to
regard compliance and cooperation with their recognized governments as an
appropriate (whether or not obligatory) contribution to a legitimate social project.
http://www.nytimes.com/2OO9/O6/11/us/politics/lljudge.html?hpw (future Supreme Court
Justice recorded as saying (rather tendentiously), "Even though Article IV of the
Constitution says that treaties are the 'supreme law of the land' in most instances they're
not even law.").
62. On this logic, Salman Rushdie was "on notice" that Iran regarded his allegedly
blasphemous literary activities as tantamount to a universal-jurisdiction crime, and therefore
assumed the risk of punishment if Iran were ever to obtain jurisdiction over his person. I
have elsewhere argued that the European Court of Human Rights committed a fundamental
error in crediting this kind of argument in the case of former East German leaders
prosecuted in the unified Federal Republic of Germany for establishing the Berlin Wall
enforcement mechanisms. Brad R. Roth, Retrospective Justice or Retroactive Standards?
Human Rights as a Sword in the East German Leaders Case, 50 WAYNE L. REv. 37 (2004).
The Court there stated that "anyone could have foreseen that, in the event of a change in
regime in the GDR, these acts might constitute criminal offenses." Streletz, Kessler, and
Krenz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 49 I.L.M. 773, para. 48 (2001) [hereinafter Krenz],
available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/view.asp?item=l &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight -
streletz&sessionid=42911039&skin=hudoc-en. This statement would as easily have
validated "victor's justice" against any number of Western officials had the Communists
prevailed in the Cold War.
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Of course, they may be morally mistaken in this, and perhaps gravely so. However,
international law, having acknowledged state authority at the time, cannot furnish a
license to vilify, in the name of law, those who acted in reliance on that authority.
Moreover, the terms of peaceful and respectful cooperation in an ideologically
diverse international community require that a prosecuting state's institutions
reliably remain within the scope of the authority that international law
acknowledges or establishes. Generally speaking, such institutions are not, and
should not be, trusted to improvise an expansion of that authority.
Thus, nullum crimen sine lege should not be seen as a formalistic obstacle to the
pursuit of justice. Nor is it in any way a mere artifact of legal positivism. It is itself
a natural law principle-not in any mystical sense, but in the sense that it embodies
concerns at the core of what it means, everywhere and always, to speak of a
criminal conviction under law.
63
C. Jurisdictional Limitations and Immunity Ratione Materiae
In international criminal law, exorbitant extraterritorial assertion of prescriptive
jurisdiction implicates the nullum crimen principle.64 Most violations of
international law lead to liability only for states as corporative entities. In support
of only a small subset of states' human rights obligations does international law
establish penal responsibility for individual participants in state action, and only
within that range does international law license the exercise of universal
jurisdiction.65 A prosecuting state's extraterritorial penal legislation or judge-made
63. This article is not intended as a contribution to contemporary analytical jurisprudence.
Whereas contending schools of legal philosophy might use international criminal justice to
illustrate a theoretical problem, this article is concerned with that topic as such, and is
indifferent to whether naturalism or a positivism provides an analytically superior account
of the normative dilemmas that international criminal justice poses. What is important to
demonstrate, however, is that the article's normative claims are not incompatible with a
naturalist account.
64. See, e.g., Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice's Decision in Congo v.
Belgium: How Has It Affected the Development of a Principle of Universal Jurisdiction that
Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 63, 93 (2003)
("[T]he post-war [Geneva] conventions clearly grant states the authority to prescribe [law-
of-war] violations in absentia. Otherwise, state prosecutions of offenses based on the
conventions would run afoul of the principle nullem crimen sine lege.").
65. Some scholars and jurists continue to assert, on the basis of the so-called "Lotus principle,"
Case of the S.S. Lotus (France. v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7), that
exercises of extraterritorial penal jurisdiction are presumed to be permitted except where
specifically prohibited. See Yerodia, supra note 1, at 167-171(diss. op. of Judge ad hoc Van
den Wyngaert, paras. 48-5 1). In actuality, the Lotus "majority" opinion (only six of twelve
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doctrine violates nullum crimen where it asserts universal jurisdiction over an
individual's participation in an international law violation that has not been
established as an international crime.
66
A closely related limitation is the doctrine of immunity ratione materiae, or
functional immunity.67 This form of immunity impedes a domestic court's exercise
of jurisdiction over both current and former foreign-state agents for acts that those
agents committed inside their national territory within the scope of their
governmental functions, except insofar as those acts have been established as
international crimes.68 Antonio Cassese construes immunity ratione materiae, not
judges, with the President voting twice) only admitted this as a possibility, never actually
asserting this position definitively. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 at 15-17
("[Wlhichever of the two systems described above [extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
permitted unless specifically prohibited, or prohibited unless specifically permitted] be
adopted, the same result will be arrived at in this particular case."); see Yerodia, supra note
1, at 43 (sep. op. of Judge Guillaume, paras. 14-15). To the extent that it was ever valid, this
"doctrine . . . has fallen into obsolescence as a consequence of the development of the
doctrine of jurisdiction according to which any State activity iure imperii requires a
reasonable link." Christian Tomuschat, Concluding Remarks, in THE FUNDAMENTAL
RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA
OMNEs 425, 436, 439 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., Martinus
Nijhoff, 2006); but see Summers, supra note 64, at 95 (invoking the separate opinion in
Yerodia of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal to assert the continued vitality of
that doctrine).
66. See Colangelo, supra note 3, at 14-15. And yet, although the Torture Convention's
universal jurisdiction provisions expressly pertain only to acts of "torture," see Torture
Convention, supra note 16, arts. 1, 4, and 5, as distinct from "cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment or punishment," id. art. 16, the official commentary to "Princeton Principles"
calls for universal jurisdiction to be applied to the latter as well. THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 48-49. This prescription flies
boldly in the face of the traditional determination in penal jurisprudence "not to fill
omissions in legislation where this can be said to have been deliberate." Prosecutor v.
Delali6, Mucic, Delic & Landzo (4 elebi~i), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, T 412 (Nov.
16, 1998).
67. Immunity ratione materiae is conceptually distinct from the immunity ratione personae, or
personal immunity, which applies exclusively to officials who conduct a state's foreign
relations (including heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, and diplomats).
Those who hold personal immunity are shielded from foreign-state legal processes
altogether, irrespective of the subject matter of the controversy, but only during those
officials' terms of service. See Yerodia, supra note 1, para. 60; CASSESE, supra note 10, at
265-67, 271-73.
68. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal
Court, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 407, 412-413 (2004); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in
International Law, 46 THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 240-44
(Humphrey Waldock & R. Y. Jennings eds., 46 Oxford 1972-73). This immunity follows
from the traditional view that "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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as a procedural bar to jurisdiction, but as a "substantive defence," available to "any
de jure or de facto State agent" performing official acts, establishing that the
"violation is not legally imputable to [the agent] but to his state." 69
Cassese may overstate the case slightly; it may be more precise to characterize
the doctrine as a procedural bar with substantive implications. Immunity ratione
materiae is tied to the logic of state immunity, as it guards against the use of
prosecutions and lawsuits against current and former state officials as a device to
circumvent the immunities attaching to the state itself. Inasmuch as immunity
ratione materiae exists for the state's, rather than the agent's, benefit, it is both
broader and narrower in its coverage than the nullum crimen defense: broader, in
that it applies even to those acts, committed under color of official capacity, that
are crimes under the law of the agent's state;70 narrower, in that the state (perhaps
following regime change) can decide post hoc to waive the defense, thereby
leaving the agent "hung out to dry. 71
However, it is possible for the nullum crimen defense to arise directly from
immunity ratione materiae, just as it may arise from an exorbitant assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. A prosecuting state's effort to establish criminal
liability for a non-criminal breach of international law violates nullum crimen even
where the state's internationally-recognized jurisdiction to prescribe (on, say, a
"territorial effects" or "passive personality" rationale) may reach the perpetrator's
conduct, so long as immunity ratione materiae applies to the conduct. Where the
foreign perpetrator acted inside his national territory and within the scope of his
official capacity, immunity ratione materiae blocks the prosecuting state's
jurisdiction to prescribe, leaving no penal law that condemns the agent's conduct.
Even if the perpetrator's state were to waive immunity post hoc, it would lack
authority to waive the nullum crimen component, which would remain in place as a
personal defense.
69. CASSESE, supra note 10, at 266; accord Akande, supra note 68, at 412-15.
70. See, e.g., Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (Pinochet III), 1 A.C.
147, 203 (1999) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson: "Actions which are criminal under the local law
can still have been done officially and therefore give rise to immunity ratione materiae.").
71. See, e.g., Pinochet III, supra note 70, at 265 (Lord Saville, opinion) ("These immunities
belong not to the individual but to the state in question. They exist in order to protect the
sovereignty of that state from interference by other states. They can, of course, ... be
waived by the state in question.").
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D. The Doctrine of Strict Interpretation (Lenity)
A corollary to nullum crimen is the doctrine of strict interpretation: "where
there is a plausible difference of interpretation or application, the position which
most favors the accused should be adopted. '7 2 The familiar domestic law term for
the doctrine is the principle of "lenity. 73
The principle applies most straightforwardly where codification is present. As
the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has elaborated:
The rule of strict construction requires that the language of a particular provision shall be
construed so that no cases shall be held to fall within it which do not both fall within the
reasonable meaning of its terms and within the spirit and scope of the enactment... The
accepted view is that if the legislature has not used words sufficiently comprehensive to
include within its prohibition all cases which should naturally fall within the mischief
intended to be prevented, the interpreter is not competent to extend them.
74
In international criminal law, the lack of thoroughgoing codification renders
inevitable some flexibility in the application of the principle. State practice and
manifestations of opinio juris (such as military manuals) are frequently taken to
establish individual penal responsibility for "serious violations" of international
norms that, while not expressly penal in nature, have systematically admitted penal
enforcement. 75 Moreover, as Antonio Cassese points out, "gaps or lacunae" are
frequently filled by resort to "general principles of international criminal law, or to
general principles of criminal justice, or to principles common to the major legal
72. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 502 (Aug. 2, 2001); see CASSESE,
supra note 10, at 153-57; see also Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 17, art. 22(2) ("The
definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being
investigated, prosecuted or convicted.").
73. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345 (1994).
74. Prosecutor v. Delalie et al. (eelebiei), supra note 66, 410; see Robinson, supra note 2, at
933.
75. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & Louis DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, 568-73, 604-605 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (noting the
relevance of military manuals). Most prominently, the ICTY has held "serious violations"
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to fall within its mandate; in order to
qualify, the violation "must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values," "must
involve grave consequences for the victim," and "must entail, under customary or
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule."
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 94 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). The
Tadik court's criteria, drawn from Nuremberg, emphasized "State practice indicating an
intention to criminalize the prohibition, including statements by government officials and
international organizations, as well as punishment of violations by national courts and
military tribunals." Id. 128.
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systems of the world.",7 6 Nullum crimen sine lege does not necessarily entail
nullum crimen sine lex scripta, even from a positivistic standpoint.
Where codification is absent, the requirement of strict interpretation needs to be
applied to whatever basis the applicable legal order specifies as adequate to
establish the penal standard. The substantive question remains whether there exists
"a plausible difference of interpretation or application. 77 The doctrine's goal
remains to provide for "fair warning" and for a barrier to "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." 78 Given that international criminal law has most
often been addressed to egregious atrocities rather than to borderline cases, even
rather woolly penal standards have frequently found relatively uncontroversial
application.
Some demands for relaxation of the principle, however, derive not from the
need to acknowledge informal sources of positive law, but from claims that the
principle itself is flawed in failing to allow consideration of the moral context of its
application. Dan M. Kahan observes that the "notice" argument for lenity
works well when a court is applying a statute that sits on the boundary line between
socially desirable and socially undesirable conduct ... Because these laws are understood
to invite individuals to come right up to the line between what is a crime and what is not,
obscurity as to where that line is drawn is indeed grossly unfair. But the situation is quite
different when the underlying conduct is located not on the border, but deep within the
interior of what is socially undesirable... The purpose of these "interior" offenses is not
so much to inform citizens of what conduct is prohibited as it is to create or increase
criminal penalties for conduct that is already understood to be absolutely forbidden by
independent laws or social mores. . . In this context, a person who consciously seeks to
76. CASSESE, supra note 10, at 155. Cassese further points out that many international rules
have open-ended provisions-such as "other inhumane acts of a similar character," Rome
Statute of the ICC, supra note 17, art. 7(l)(k)--that expressly or impliedly call for
analogical reasoning to fill inevitable gaps. Id. at 155-56.
77. Prosecutor v. Krstie, supra note 72, 502.
78. As the U.S. Supreme Court has declared:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see Parry,
supra note 24, at 1041.
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come up to the statutory "line" without crossing it is not attempting to conform her
behavior to the law, but rather to evade punishment for admittedly wrongful or illegal
acts.
79
The latter behavior that Kahan describes is sometimes said to be malum in se, as
opposed to malum prohibitum, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the lenity
principle.80 And indeed, where a genuine consensus of the relevant community is
well known to regard the conduct as heinous, the absence of moral disagreement
weighs strongly (though maybe not decisively) in favor of improvising penal
standards. This solution quite plausibly applies in the international criminal justice
context where, for example, state agents have inflicted cruelties, of a type
unspecified in existing instruments or in expressions of opinio juris, that are either
gratuitous or manifestly directed toward an illegitimate objective (e.g., terrorizing
a local population so as to drive it from a territory)-that is, not substantially
related to a cognizable governmental purpose.
This, however, is precisely where extreme cases are prone to generate bad dicta.
Consensus on the wrongfulness of conduct viewed in isolation does not imply
consensus on the wrongfulness of conduct viewed in context. Where state officials
authorize acts, the authorization likely reflects some bonafide--even if objectively
misguided or reprehensible-conception of the public interest. Except where that
conception itself represents mass persecution or some similarly inadmissible goal,
such acts are not malum in se in the relevant sense, notwithstanding that their
presumptive immorality is universally acknowledged and that they trigger state
responsibility for breach of an international legal obligation. 81 Even with respect to
acknowledged serious human rights violations, states only exceptionally consent to
subject their agents to international penal norms; absent such consent, express or
tacit, states cannot be said to have authorized such external exercises of power over
their agents. 82 The authority for prosecution, which needs to be specifically
79. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 400-01
(1994) (emphasis added).
80. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1692 (2005).
81. This is true even where the international obligations in question are "non-derogable." Non-
derogable means that there is no defense on the international plane to breach of the
international legal obligation. It does not mean that a breaching act is ultra vires of state
authority. See the discussion of jus cogens, infra.
82. Beyond the general principle of strict interpretation of penal norms, there is a further rule of
treaty interpretation that militates against an expansive reading of international penal
standards. Treaties must be read in light of "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969). Immunity ratione materiae is such
a relevant rule.
8 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010)
conferred, is to that extent withheld. As the ICTY has recognized in elaborating the
principle of strict interpretation, "It has always been the practice of courts not to
fill omissions in legislation where this can be said to have been deliberate."
83
The recent U.S. controversy over penal liability for torture provides an
illustration. The Torture Convention establishes international penal responsibility
for individual state agents for "torture" (Article 1), but only state responsibility for
"cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" (Article 16). A U.S. penal statute
implements the Convention's torture provisions (including conferral of universal
jurisdiction).85 A notorious 2002 memorandum of the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel purported to ascertain the statute's threshold of "severe pain or
suffering." 86 It is now widely agreed that the memorandum badly mis-specified
this threshold,87 but there remains a question of whether the very effort to identify
the threshold with precision was, in Jeremy Waldron's words, a "legally reputable
enterprise. 88
Waldron suggests that the malum in se nature of both torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment renders the effort to ascertain the boundary line
between them both superfluous and mischievous. 89 The memorandum "failed to
mention that both categories of conduct were and are absolutely prohibited" in
83. Prosecutor v. Delali6 et al. (Celebi6i), supra note 66, 412.
84. See Roth, Just Short of Torture, supra note 20; Yuval Shany, The Prohibition Against
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment: Can the Absolute
Be Relativized under Existing International Law?, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 862 (2007).
85. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006).
86. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of the Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 172, 172 (Aug. 1, 2002) (reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABu GHRAI3 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2005). The memorandum's most notorious claim was that "[p]hysical pain amounting
to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death." Id. at 172.
Unconvincing as this claim is, it should be noted that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A is a
universal jurisdiction statute addressed exclusively to acts occurring abroad, and thus
primarily envisioned to apply to foreign state agents. Its threshold was therefore designed to
identify "enemies of humanity," rather than ordinary lawbreakers.
87. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 175, 197
(2006); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law
Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811,
834-35 (2005); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. Rev.
1425, 1454-56 (2005).
88. Waldron, Torture and Positive Law, supra note 80, at 1705.
89. Id. at 1700-09
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international law. 90 It thus wrongly presupposed that interrogators "are permitted to
work somewhere along the continuum of the deliberate infliction of pain, and the
question is: Where is the bright line along that continuum where the specific
prohibition on torture kicks in?" 91 For Waldron, then, notice of the precise location
of "severity" boundary line is not only unnecessary, but a pernicious invitation to
the gaming of the system:
[W]e need to remember that the charge of torture is unlikely to be surprising or
unanticipated by someone already engaged in the deliberate infliction of pain on prisoners:
"I am shocked-shocked! -to find that 'water boarding' or squeezing prisoners' genitals
or setting dogs on them is regarded as torture." Remember, we are talking about precision
or imprecision in regard to a particular element in the definition of torture-the severity
element. The potential defendant is one who already knows that he is inflicting
considerable pain; that is his intention. The question he faces is whether the pain is severe
enough to constitute torture. It seems to me that the working definition in the anti-torture
statute already gives him all the warning he needs that he is taking a huge risk in relying
upon casuistry about "severity" as a defense against allegations of torture.
9 2
Waldron's point, though persuasive in regard to the question of legal ethics with
which he is primarily concerned, 93 is misleading insofar as it suggests that
international criminal justice can proceed without close regard to the "severity"
threshold. States, in distinguishing torture from cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, deliberately established a basis for international penal liability up to that
point, but no farther.94 Short of international penal thresholds, states have
90. Id. at 1706.
91. Id. at 1705.
92. Id. at 1700.
93. Given the specific context, Waldron is correct to question the ethics of the legal project that
the memorandum represented (let alone the manner in which the project was carried out). In
providing perpetrators with advance notice of which wrongs do not entail criminal liability,
the project constituted deliberate complicity in human rights violations. There is good
reason to believe that lawyers have a professional responsibility to avoid partaking in such a
project. See David Luban, Torture and the Professions, 26 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
(Summer/Fall, 1, 2 (2007)).
94. Note, however, that cruel and inhuman treatment committed against captured enemy
soldiers and enemy civilians in international armed conflicts does give rise to universal
jurisdiction under the terms of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions (articles 130 and
147, respectively). Shany, supra note 84, at 862. Moreover, while the more sweeping
prohibition of cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment in Common Article 3, pertaining
to all categories of persons, even in non-international armed conflicts, does not specify
penal enforcement, the ICC Statute provides for penal sanctions, at least when the
violations are "committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission
of such crimes." Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 17, arts. 8(1), 8(2)(c). In addition,
"serious violations" of that Geneva standard now plausibly give rise to universal
jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-
BECK, supra note 75, at 568-607; Roth, Just Short of Torture, supra note 20, at 236.
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maintained a monopoly of domestic authority over their agents' conduct within
national territory, in full contemplation that states from time to time exercise that
authority in breach of their international legal obligations. Those agents cannot
properly be held responsible to a supra-positive standard of "socially desirable
conduct," because states have reserved the last word on what counts as "socially
desirable" for purposes of evaluating their own agents' conduct. 
95
Thus, in the zone of conduct to which states have refused to extend a positive
penal norm, a locally authoritative decision to breach international obligations for
the sake of a cognizable governmental purpose, such as extraction of information
from alleged terrorists, vitiates the moral consensus needed to justify relaxation of
the norm of strict interpretation. Lenity can arguably yield to a genuine moral
consensus, but not to an illusory one.
Nullum crimen sine lege and the conjoined doctrines of jurisdictional limitation,
immunity ratione materiae and strict interpretation reflect morally significant
purposes of the international legal order. This is not to deny that these principles
are subject to countervailing considerations. Legality is always a matter of
judgment, and can never avoid the balancing of conflicting considerations of
political morality. But respect for the nullum crimen principle creates a
presumption that only an extraordinary justification can overcome. Nullum crimen
.• • ,96
is, after all, frequently known simply as "the principle of legality."
III. Extraordinary Circumstances: Rule-of-Law Standards in
Judging the Unrechtsstaat
The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin contends (quite controversially) that
interpretive judgment must include, inter alia, an assessment of "which
interpretation, all things considered, makes the community's legal record the best it
can be from the point of view of political morality."97 While there is some reason
to be concerned about Dworkin's tendency, in his own normative jurisprudence, to
take this abstract proposition as license to disregard inconvenient aspects of the
95. As John Parry's study discloses, the U.S. negotiated actively to limit the definition of
torture, and reinforced that definition's narrowness by attaching interpretive understandings
to its instrument of ratification. Parry, supra note 24, at 1036-43. The purpose, Parry
contends, was precisely "to preserve space for coercive interrogation." Id. at 1046.
96. See CASSESE, supra note 10, at 149 ("[T]he principle of non-retroactivity of criminal rules
is now solidly embodied in international law. It follows that courts may only apply
substantive criminal rules that existed at the time of commission of the alleged crime.").
97. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 411 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
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"legal record," 98 doubts about the probity of particular applications do not refute
the proposition.
99
Even a determination of the law of a foreign jurisdiction must be sensitive to the
reason why one wants to know what that law is. Certainly a judge does not
properly seek to make the legal doctrine of foreign political community the best
that it can be,' 00 but nor is the judge, in making a finding of foreign law, acting as a
social scientist or an historian. Rather, she is implementing some norm of her own
system that requires due respect for the foreign entity, and the precise respect that
is due depends on the nature of the decision that confronts the court. How
ambiguities should be resolved may depend, for example, on whether a litigant is
invoking foreign law as a sword or as a shield. '
The problem takes on a special dimension when a judge in a rule-of-law-
oriented system undertakes to determine the effects of law from a non-rule-of-law-
oriented system. 10 2 This topic has engendered considerable confusion, some of it
98. See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin's 'Moral Reading' of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1259, 1270
(1997) ("The division of labor is as follows: The Dworkin of Right Answers decides all
important contested cases, while the Dworkin of Fit defends against charges of judicial
imperialism.").
99. Legal positivists, of course, reject the proposition. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Ethics in the
Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, 194, 209 (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1994). But their fidelity to nullum crimen sine lege, albeit merely as "a very
precious principle of morality endorsed by most legal systems," Hart, supra note 43, at 619,
is seldom questioned. For positivists, there can be no other source of "lege" than the
political order recognized as authoritative at the time and place of the act. Their critique of
Dworkin's brand of naturalism will thus be passed over here, as will this author's reasons
for rejecting that critique.
100. See Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof and Interpretation of Foreign Law: A Comparative
Study in Private International Law, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 240 (1995).
101. Additionally, a court can simply refuse to sustain a foreign law-based cause of action that
contradicts a strong public policy of the forum jurisdiction, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1969), but that rule is supposed to have "a very narrow scope of
application," id § 90 cmt. a.
102. In his concurrence in the European Court's Krenz judgment (upholding the Berlin Wall
prosecutions), Judge Levits contended that "there is no room for other solutions" than "to
apply the 'old' law, set by the previous non-democratic regime, according to the approach
to interpretation and application of the law which is inherent in the new democratic political
order." In his view, "Using any other method of applying the law ... would damage the
very core of the ordre public of a democratic state." Krenz, supra note 62, paras. 7-8
(Levits, J., concurring).
But it is hard to see why this is so in cases where nullification of unjust law operates as a
sword rather than as a shield. To be sure, a liberal-democratic system must refuse
applications of illiberal legal standards that would deny individuals the benefits of liberal
justice. Here, however, what works the denial of liberal justice (at least prima facie) is the
refusal to afford the defendants the protection of the standards, however illiberal, that were
valid at the time and place of the conduct. Nullum crimen is itself a principle at "the very
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introduced by none other than Lon Fuller. In his landmark debate with H.L.A. Hart
in the pages of the Harvard Law Review in 1958, Fuller applied his critique of
legal positivism to the question of retrospective justice in post-Hitler Germany.
Unfortunately, in doing so, be conflated two questions: (i) whether Nazi
Germany's state security enactments and the mode of their enforcement could
properly be characterized as a form, however unjust, of "law"; and (ii) whether
egregious acts (other than international crimes, such as those prosecuted at
Nuremberg), consistent with the dictates of established political authority during
the Nazi period, could justifiably be construed retrospectively as crimes.
The first question is the one that analytical jurisprudence poses. It is, for present
purposes, uninteresting. Nazi Germany did not observe the rule of law, and indeed,
espoused a contrary doctrine of "legality," eschewing predictability and
accountability in the exercise of power, as a matter of principle. 10 3 The political
order did, as Fuller acknowledged, engage in standard legal regulation of many
fields of activity, such as inheritance and contracts (even though no legal decision
was immune from political interference if state or party officials took an interest in
it). In areas related to Nazism's distinctive agenda, social regulation was decidedly
non-standard. Enactments provided subjects with information about what was
expected of them, but entailed no promise that acts not specifically prohibited were
permitted. 0 4 Enactments operated to hold lower-level officials accountable to
higher-level ones, but they were an instrument of, not a constraint upon, the
policies of the highest organs of the state and the party. 105 Legalistic mechanisms
were one means of implementing the leadership's will, but extra-legal means were
tolerated and given retroactive "legal" imprimatur. The idea is summarized in the
German term Unrechtsstaat.1
06
core of the ordre public of a democratic state." If there is a danger of eroding that core, it
far more plausibly emanates from indulging the retroactive expansion of criminal liability in
pursuit of material justice, a quintessential practice of illiberal regimes.
103. See MOLLER, supra note 51, at 68-81.
104. See id. at 75.
105. As Hans Frank, Reich Commissioner for Justice, put it in 1936: "The National Socialist
ideology, especially as expressed in the Party programme and in the speeches of our leader,
is the basis for interpreting legal sources." RICHARD J. EVANS, THE THIRD REICH IN POWER
50, 73 (Penguin Books 2005) (1936).
106. For a discussion of uses and abuses of this term, see Jan-Werner Muller, East Gennany:
Incorporation, Tainted Truth, and the Double Division, in THE POLITICS OF MEMORY:
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES 248, 249 n.2 (Alexandra Barahona
de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez & Paloma Aguilar eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
Unrechtsstaat "refers to a state that not only perpetrates systematic injustice through its
laws, but also breaks its own laws. What makes the notion so charged is that all too often
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It is not clear what, precisely, is to be accomplished by asking whether this
mode of order counts as "law."' 0 7 The regime's enactments are usefully understood
to have been law for some purposes, but not for others, and any sweeping answer
is likely to obfuscate rather than to clarify the realities.
The second question is whether nullum crimen sine lege precludes prosecution
of persons whose egregious conduct comported with the norms of the established
order. Fuller's answer to this question plays out in the course of a famous, if not
precisely factual, account of a 1949 West German prosecution of the wife of a
World War II German soldier. 10 8 The wife had, in the wake of the failed 1944
assassination attempt against Hitler, truthfully informed the Nazi authorities of her
husband's private anti-Fifhrer grumblings, knowing-and indeed, intending,
apparently for ulterior and utterly non-ideological reasons-the consequence: the
Nazi justice system arrested her husband, convicted him of what was then
purported to be a crime, and sentenced him to death (though the death sentence
was never carried out). Post-war prosecutors charged the wife under an 1871
statute, continuously in effect throughout the period, that had criminalized the
illegal deprivation of a person's freedom. 10 9 The wife's defense, in Hart's and
Fuller's telling of the story, was that the deprivation of the husband's freedom had
not been illegal, as it had occurred pursuant to a pair of repressive Nazi-era
statutes, dated from 1934 and 1938, which were implemented in accordance with
Nazi-era standards of interpretation. "
0
the concept of Unrechtsstaat has served to lump together the Third Reich and the DDR." Id.
at 261. Post-reunification German courts convicted GDR officials by interpreting GDR law
"in the way it might have been interpreted in a Rechtsstaat, in the way most favorable to
human rights, when in fact the law was regularly instrumentalized for political purposes in
East Germany." Id.; see also Howard J. De Nike, Judges on Trial: A Cultural View of the
Prosecution of East German Jurists, 18 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 83 (1995).
107. [E]ither. .. Nazi Germany had law though it was very bad law or because its law was so
bad it was not really law at all. Nothing turns on which way we speak so long as we make
plain what further point we wish to make in speaking that way.@ Ronald Dworkin, Hart and
the Concepts of Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 95, 98-99 (2006).
108. Hart invoked the case in Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, see supra, note
43, at 615-21, and then Fuller commented on it at greater length in his response, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, supra note 43, at 648-61. For details of the
disparities between the actual case and the account of it that Hart and Fuller rendered, see
H.O. Pappe, On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era, 23 MODERN L.REV. 260
(1960).
109. Hart, supra note 43, at 619.
110. The 1934 Nazi statute criminalized, inter alia, "spiteful and or provocative statements
directed against, or statements which disclose a base disposition toward, the leading
personalities of the nation," even where these statements were made in private "when the
person making them realized or should have realized that they would reach the public;" the
1938 statute established the death penalty for publicly seeking "to injure or destroy the will
of the German people.. .to assert themselves stalwartly against their enemies." Fuller, supra
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Fuller's response to this case is distinctive. A classical naturalist might simply
have argued that the wife's act was so substantively unjust, and her defense so
dependent for shelter on a legal order that notoriously regularized egregious
substantive injustice, that legality, properly so called, demanded her punishment."'
But Fuller seems to have understood that such an approach would invite precisely
the kind of subjective judgment, pertaining to the exercise of power over the most
fundamental human interests, that the rule of law distrustfully precludes.
112
Therefore, Fuller set out to establish that the Nazi statutes and juridical practice at
issue, through their violation of law's "internal morality," lacked the formal
qualities of law, and so could simply be removed from the analysis, leaving only
the 1871 statute condemning the wife's conduct. The 1934 and 1938 statutes were,
after all, designedly vague in their proscriptions, and where even this was
insufficient to serve the regime's purpose of criminalizing a "base disposition"
toward the leadership, terms were routinely interpreted beyond their ordinary
meaning: statements made in private were assimilated to those made in public, and
the death penalty for one category of crime was transposed to a different
note 43, at 653-54. Nazi courts "quite generally disregarded" the publicity element of the
latter crime. Id. at 654.
111. The German legal scholar Gustav Radbruch, to whom both Hart and Fuller refer, adopted
this approach. Radbruch articulated what has come to be known as his "formula" as
follows:
The conflict between justice and legal certainty may be resolved in that positive law,
secured by command and force, takes precedence even when its content is unjust and
unreasonable, assuming however that the positive law does not depart from justice to
such an unbearable extent, that it has to give way to justice as "incorrect law." It is
impossible to draw a sharper line between cases of statutory non-law and law that is still
valid in spite of an inappropriate content, but a different boundary line can be drawn
with greater clarity: where no attempt is even made to achieve justice, where equality,
which is the heart of justice, is consciously denied in the creation of positive law, then
the law is not merely to be called "incorrect," it entirely loses its character as law.
Julian Rivers, The Interpretation and Invalidity of Unjust Laws, in RECRAFTING THE RULE
OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF THE LEGAL ORDER 40, 42 (David Dyzenhaus ed., Hart Publishing
1999) (quoting Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und Ubergesetzliches Recht, in
SUDDEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 105-08 (1946)). The formula is alluring in the
realm of thought experiments, where the mind that judges the propriety of licensing such
decisions is the same one that would be entrusted with the license to decide the extent of
objective immorality. Real-life conferrals of discretionary authority are less reassuring. As
Radbruch himself affirmed, id, the sensibility underlying the rule of law is at least
distrustful of, even if it does not absolutely exclude, such empowered moralism.
112. "Professor Hart and others have been understandably distressed by references to a 'higher
law' in some of the decisions concerning informers and in Radbruch's postwar writings."
Fuller, supra note 43, at 659.
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category.11 3 The statutes served as open-ended licenses to inflict severe repression
on anyone manifesting opposition to the regime (all the more so, one imagines, in
the wake of the 1944 assassination attempt against Hitler, which had been the
subject matter of the husband's untoward comments).
Fuller's strategy for vindicating the wife's conviction, however expedient, was
misconceived, for it confused the question of how the rule of law treats acts
performed under a previously authoritative system with the question of whether
that previous system conformed to the criteria of the rule of law. What matters for
the former purposes-at least, to the extent that one does not wish to make the
classical naturalist move-is the positive authoritativeness of the norms that the
defendant followed, not the formal character of those norms. Nullum crimen sine
lege places the burden on the prosecution to establish the criminality of the wife's
conduct on the basis of legal norms authoritative when and where the conduct
occurred. This burden derives, not from formal considerations, but from the
substantive concerns about notice and authority discussed above. The pertinence of
those concerns turns on whether, at the time and place of the conduct, exculpatory
norms were authoritative and applicable, not on whether those norms possessed or
lacked a rule-of-law character.
The proper question was whether the 1871 act rendered the wife's conduct a
crime at the time of its commission, given its place alongside the enactments and
officially espoused interpretive methods characteristic of the German legal order of
1944. To be sure, concealed judicial manipulations, manifesting a conscious
corruption, would not affect the determination of the legal order's standards; these
would have been exercises of power, but not of authority, and would have created
an expectation that one could get away with an act, but not an expectation that one
was acting within the law. In contrast, however, idiosyncratic interpretive methods,
if openly adopted, are undeniably part of a positive legal order.114 The wife's
113. Id. at 653-55.
114. A substitution of interpretive method-attributing to words an "objective" meaning at
variance with the meaning that they had in the legal culture in which they were
embedded-is incompatible with the nullum crimen principle. No country's legal
enactments can be said to have meanings so objective that their terms can be applied
without regard to their context and to the overall framework within which they are routinely
interpreted. Persons operating within such a framework cannot properly be left at the mercy
of a hostile outsider's decontextualized semantic analysis. This author has harshly criticized
the European Court of Human Rights for holding to the contrary in Krenz, supra note 62,
para. 81. See Roth, Retrospective Justice or Retroactive Standards?, supra note 62, at 50-
56. For other critical accounts of the decision, see W. N. FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 244-48 (T.M.C.
Asser Press 2006); KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 220-22, 375-76 (Cambridge
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conduct could be prosecuted in full compliance with nullum crimen sine lege if,
but only if, the Nazi regime, in seeking its own legitimation, traded on the
existence of a legal order within which the wife's conduct would have counted as a
crime.
Subsequent commentary has revealed a plausible (though far from
incontestable) account of the legal facts and the wife's conduct on which a case
within such specifications could have been (and in the actual event, was) made in
the post-war West German court. 5 But Fuller had no interest in making that
claim, which would have fallen short of the point he was trying to establish.
Furthermore, in emphasizing the flawed character of the exculpatory norms,
Fuller's theory of the case neglects the fact that the wife did no more than to report
facts truthfully (so far as is reported) to officials who were, beyond cavil, duly
authorized to receive such testimony. Fuller's analysis would more plausibly have
had bearing on the criminal liabilities of the prosecutors and judges who applied
the open-ended license, 116 deriving from the Nazi legal order's distinctive
"jurisprudence," to disguise an extreme act of mere political repression as the
execution of a lawful sentence. 117
University Press 2009) (noting disapprovingly the retroactive nullification of a justificatory
defense).
115. See Pappe, supra note 108, at 267-68, 271. According to Pappe, the judiciary maintained a
clear understanding that convictions of this type represented a subversion of their legal
duties. "To regard intimidation in the interest of the ruling party as the declared purpose of
the German criminal law at the time of the death sentence, as Hart suggests, is . . . an
arbitrary assumption." Id. at 271. Moreover, Pappe contends, the political subversion of
judicial duty was notorious. "A mistaken belief in the legality of the court-martial procedure
would be a defence only for a person who could not be expected to share the insights of
ordinary members of the public." Id. at 268. In the actual case, the wife was found to have
been fully conscious of the judiciary's departure from established legal standards, and in
testifying in court in full knowledge of the consequences for her husband, willfully
exploited that departure to her own selfish, apolitical ends. Id. at 268. For a contrary
understanding of the openly espoused ethos of the German court system during this period,
which might call into question both Pappe's analysis and the actual West German court
holding, see MULLER, supra note 51.
116. The Third Reich judges who sentenced the husband to death for maligning the Fuihrer were
not prosecuted. The reason, Pappe reports, "was not that they had been acting lawfully in
the execution of public justice, but that they had the defence of intimidation, and that,
therefore, no court would sentence them." Pappe regards the claim of danger to the judges
as exaggerated, and the invocation of this excuse to reveal "an extremely weak point in
post-Nazi judicature." Pappe, supra note 108, at 268.
117. Nullum crimen sine lege is justifiably interpreted to allow prosecution of conduct that, "at
the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations." International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 15(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
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The wife, however, was not responsible for implementing the German criminal
code. Testifying truthfully in one's country's court system is nowhere a crime,
however wicked the motivation. Morally speaking, of course, the wife's conduct
can be assimilated to snitching to the neighborhood mob boss about her husband's
hostility, in the hope and expectation of getting her husband "rubbed out." But
unless the German government in 1944 was too evil to count as a government, or
the court too manifestly corrupt to have appeared, even by standards of the
prevailing ideology, as a real court,1 8 the wife's nullum crimen defense is sound.
This is why Hart understood the Soldier's Wife Case to pose a dilemma. As he
memorably put it:
in punishing the woman a choice had to be made between two evils, that of leaving her
unpunished and that of sacrificing a very precious principle of morality endorsed by most
legal systems. Surely if we have learned anything from the history of morals it is that the
thing to do with a moral quandary is not to hide it. Like nettles, the occasions when life
forces us to choose between the lesser of two evils must be grasped with the consciousness
that they are what they are. The vice of this use of the principle that, at certain limiting
points, what is utterly immoral cannot be law or lawful is that it will serve to cloak the true
nature of the problems with which we are faced and will encourage the romantic optimism
[hereinafter ICCPR]. This maxim cannot properly be used to circumvent empirical
dissensus about the elements of a crime or, more relevantly, about justificatory defenses;
legal systems in good standing within the empirical community of nations have been known
to authorize state-security-inspired extemporary measures, and it is an abuse of "general
principles" to nullify the exculpatory effects of such authorization. Even so, such principles
might conceivably be invoked to condemn the use of unorthodox penal jurisprudence to
disguise those measures' inherent extemporary character. To portray the husband's sentence
as a judicial application of law, rather than as an essentially extemporary act, seems
perverse, even though the soldier could hardly have lacked notice that his grumblings about
the Fttihrer, if disclosed, would have these penal consequences.
118. This latter was Pappe's position. Pappe, supra note 108, at 267-68. To be sure, some Third
Reich judicial processes were open to such characterization, especially those directed
against foreign nationals in violation of the international law of war. One set of Nuremberg
prosecutions addressed such judicial proceedings. United States v. Altstoetter, III TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (William S. Hein & Co. ed., 1997), available at
http//www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/NTwar-criminalsVol-lI.pdf. For example,
defendant Guenther Joel "was convicted for using his [judicial] 'authority and duty to
review penal cases from the Incorporated Eastern Territories after the occupation of Poland'
... to give 'final authorization' to nearly 100 illegal death sentences imposed by German
courts between 10 September 1942 to March 1943," sentences that the Nuremberg Tribunal
found to have had "'no legal basis either under the international law of warfare or under the
international common law as recognized by all civilized nations."' Kevin John Heller, John
Yoo and the Justice Case (May 1, 2008),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/j ohn-yoo-and-justice-case.html (citing Altstoetter,
supra, at 1131, 1140-42).
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that all the values we cherish ultimately will fit into a single system, that no one of them
has to be sacrificed or compromised to accommodate another. 
119
Fuller's response to this passage reveals the depth of his misunderstanding:
I hope I am not being unjust to Professor Hart when I say that I can find no way of
describing the dilemma as he sees it but to use some such words as the following: On the
one hand, we have an amoral datum called law, which has the peculiar quality of creating
a moral duty to obey it. On the other hand, we have a moral duty to do what we think is
right and decent. When we are confronted by a statute we believe to be thoroughly evil, we
have to choose between two duties.
If this is the positivist position, then I have no hesitancy in rejecting it. The "dilemma" it
states has the verbal formulation of a problem, but the problem it states makes no sense. It
is like saying that I have to choose between giving food to a starving man and being
mimsy with the borogoves. I do not think it is unfair to the positivistic philosophy to say
that it never gives any coherent meaning to the moral obligation of fidelity to law .... 120
But Fuller was indeed "being unjust to Professor Hart," because Hart's position
was in no way predicated on the proposition that "we have an amoral datum called
law, which has the peculiar quality of creating a moral duty to obey it." The
relevant moral duty is not the duty of the regime's subjects to obey the enactment,
but the duty of the rule-of-law-oriented court, in its retrospective analysis, to take
account of the considerations of notice and authority, as discussed above. Whether
or not the facts of this case justify overriding them, these are weighty
considerations, rooted in the imperatives of predictability and accountability in the
exercise of power. Whatever else may be said of the comparative merits of
positivist and naturalist accounts of such situations, it is to the credit of Hart's
positivism that it worked in this case to reveal, rather than to obfuscate, the moral
dilemma.
In the end, Hart allowed that leaving such egregious wrongdoing unpunished
might be more intolerable than using law to punish acts that were lawful when and
where committed. He was willing to entertain punishing "grudge informers" such
as the soldier's wife, though he believed that the harm to legality would be better
contained if the ex post facto criminalization were accomplished by overtly
retroactive legislation, rather than left to a court's untethered discretionary
authority. 2 That proposal, which Fuller refused to characterize as "the most
119. Hart, supra note 43, at 619-20.
120. Fuller, supra note 43, at 656.
121. Hart, supra note 43, at 619.
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nearly lawful way of making unlawful what was once law,"'122 at least addresses
the accountability concern underlying the nullum crimen principle, ruling out the
licensing of subjective reactions to the perceived moral qualities of a particular
defendant. 123 Far from being obtuse about law's relationship to morality, as Fuller
implies, Hart's approach provides a superior basis for identifying the moral stakes
of the legal question.
Even Hart's suggestion, of course, confers on a post-regime-change legal order
a doubtful authority to disrespect a defendant's adherence to a legal order
internationally recognized as authoritative at the time and place of the conduct.
However, it is important to note the nearly unique factors that mitigate the
significance of this consideration in the case of Nazi Germany. Though Germany's
government was internationally recognized, its commitment to "total war"-which
entailed pan-continental aggression and multiple genocide-belies any sense of
reliance, by the government or its subjects, on an international legal order
according the Third Reich equal juridical respect among sovereign regimes. The
Third Reich set out to destroy, and did effectively destroy, the existing
international legal order; thus, those committing violence on its behalf-perhaps
even those not directly involved in aggression or crimes against humanity-were
arguably estopped from asserting any defense peculiarly predicated on the
prosecution's obligation to recognize that regime's authority at the time and place
of its effectivity within Germany, or to dignify as "lawful" the decision of the
regime's subjects to abet that regime's distinctive political project.
Although the Allies rejected, prior to Nuremberg, a proposal to deny combatant
privilege to Wehrmacht soldiers participating in their state's unlawful offensive
uses of force,' 24 a narrower theory of estoppel, nullifying authorizations for
especially ruthless means undertaken in service of a set of ends thoroughly
inimical to international legal order, might be more compelling. Agents of the
Third Reich were on notice that their acts were part and parcel of the "total war"
122. Fuller, supra note 43, at 661.
123. Given the wife's plainly corrupt motive-in no way connected to a prevailing ideological
view about the moral justification of draconian punishments for those privately manifesting
disloyalty to the Fuihrer-it is difficult to fault the intuition that her case should be singled
out for harsh treatment. As an institutional matter, however, such assessments represent
precisely the kind of subjective judgment, pertaining to the exercise of power over the most
fundamental human interests, against which the rule of law distrustfully guards.
124. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 37 (Little Brown &
Co. 1992) (on the theory proposed by Col. William C. Chanler).
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that they might lose, and so, arguably, on notice that they might be judged on the
basis of externally prevalent minimum standards.'
25
As Hart's ambivalence makes clear, the assertion of nullum crimen is the start,
not the end, of the conversation about what ought to be done. But whether seen in
positivist terms as a moral principle external to "law" as such, or in naturalist terms
as a juridical consideration within an inherently purposive process of law
determination, nullum crimen is a compelling principle. Whatever conclusion one
might draw about disregard for nullum crimen in post-Third Reich prosecutions,
that disregard should not be taken as a model for disanalogous cases. In particular,
it should not carry over to acts undertaken under the authority of more ordinary
regimes, tyrannical though they may have been, that maintained standing within an
operational international legal and political order.
126
IV. Disagreement and the Moral Significance of Positive Law in
the International Order
At the core of the defense of international law's constraint on the pursuit of
substantive justice is the phenomenon of moral disagreement. The most basic truth
about the significance of positive law is expressed in Jeremy Waldron's simple
statement: "There are many of us, and we disagree about justice."' 127 As Waldron's
work emphasizes, the need for a binding positive legal order at the domestic level
125. This estoppel might apply, in particular, to officials exercising direction under legal
licenses-even ones grounded in an overt and elaborated jurisprudence-that sweepingly
authorized the elimination of suspected threats to national security. Those officials could
scarcely claim that the international community was bound to respect the source of this
discretionary authority on the basis of the Third Reich's standing in the then-prevailing
international order. One might analogize such limited respect to the legal prerogatives of
Third Reich officials to the limited respect accorded to agents of an unrecognized
government under the doctrine of "implied mandate." See Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-
Burke, I A.C. 645, 728-29 (U.K. Privy Council, 1969) ("[A]cts of sovereignty exercised by
... a usurper may have an obligatory force" where exercised to avoid disorder rather than to
further the usurpation.) (quoting from HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 121 (J.
Barbaric, trans., 1738)).
126. In this respect, the subsequent demise of the German Democratic Republic-generally
speaking, a member in good standing of a pluralistic international order in which Marxist-
Leninist and other "garden-variety" dictatorships were major participants in norm
formation-posed juridical questions properly understood as very different from those
posed by the demise of the Third Reich. See Roth, Retrospective Justice or Retroactive
Standards? Human Rights as a Sword in the East German Leaders Case, supra note 62, at
41-44.
127. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 36 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); see
JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (Clarendon Press 1999).
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stems as much from moral vehemence as from wilful self-interestedness. 128 This is
no less true at the international level.
It is hardly remarkable that in any human society, law functions as an
indispensable instrument of coordination and mutual restraint among constituent
elements prone to conflicts of interest. But often neglected is the extent to which
positive law-emanating from the "sovereign" authority of states, whether
individually or collectively-operates as a response to conflicts rooted in moral
disagreement. No society, domestic or international, can afford to allow its
members to pursue justice, as they severally understand it, to the limit of their
individual capacities. As Waldron points out:
[T]he Rule of Law is not simply the principle that an official or citizens should apply and
obey the law even when it disserves their own interests. It is the principle that an official
or citizen should do this even when the law is-in their confident opinion-unjust,
morally wrong, or misguided as a matter of policy. For the enactment of the measure in
question is evidence of a view concerning its justice, morality, or desirability which is
different from their own; someone must have been in favor of the law or thought it a good
idea. In other words, the law's existence, together with the individual's own opinion, is
evidence of moral disagreement in the community on the underlying issue. The official's
failure to implement the law because it is unjust, or the citizen's doing something other
than what the law requires because that would be more just, is tantamount to abandoning
the very idea of law-the verY idea of the community taking a position on an issue on
which its members disagree.
12
Justice, however objective a phenomenon it may be, appears in various and
clashing ways to the minds of any society's members, who are no less prone to
conflict when acting in a spirit of righteousness than when pursuing unprincipled
ends. It is this basic truth that led Kant, typically identified with the primacy of
individual conscience, to call for compliance with-indeed, absolute obedience
to130-- the norms of a successfully established political order. Whereas James
Madison famously ventured that "[i]f men were angels, no government would be
necessary,"'1 31 Kant was more perceptive:
Even if we imagine men to be ever so good natured and righteous before a public lawful
state of society is established, individual men, nations, and states can never be certain that
128. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 127, at 46, 51.
129. Id. at 37.
130. See Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory But It Does Not
Apply in Practice', in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 81 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970).
131. James Madison, TheFederalist No. 51, in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 202, 203 (Michael Kammen ed., Penguin Books 1986).
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they are secure against violence from one another, because each will have his own right to
do what seems just and good to him, entirely independent of the opinion of the others.'
3 2
A domestic legal order solves this problem through the centralization of
legislative, adjudicative, and executive authority, a centralization predicated on a
notional commonality-however often illusory or imposed-of core interests and
values within the political unit. The international legal order, however, is
predicated on a much less robust perceived commonality of interests and values.
Accordingly, while the latter order establishes positive legal obligations through
treaty processes and norm-generating customary practice, it largely lacks
centralized processes for the adjudication and enforcement of international legal
norms. There is frequently no international court with jurisdiction over an alleged
transgression, and even more frequently, no international body with the authority
to compel compliance or to impose penalties for non-compliance. A territorial
state's consent is most often a requisite, not only to a norm's recognition, but also
to its implementation. 133 The crucial question is whether, absent a state's consent
to the implementation, within its territory, of norms recognized to be binding on
that state, other states-whether individually, in an established "regional
arrangement,"1340r in an ad hoc "coalition of the willing"135-may find within
international law a license to engage in extraterritorial application and enforcement
of those norms: in other words, a right of self-help.
The problem, of course, is that self-help re-introduces the dangers that positive
legal orders are meant to counter. Each state "will have [its] own right to do what
132. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, at 76, §44 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1965), quoted in Jeremy Waldron, Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22
PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 3, 4-5, 14-15 (1993). Waldron's work has built substantially on
the observation that Kant attributed the perils of the state of nature not to selfishness, but to
moral vehemence.
133. Apart from the special powers entrusted to the United Nations Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter, no state or intergovernmental organization has-or even
claims-law enforcement authority within the territory of a foreign state. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2)
(1987) ("A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of
another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of
that state."); see also G.A. Res. 46/182, U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/182 (Dec. 19, 1991)
(acknowledging that humanitarian operations within a state's territory require the state's
consent).
134. See U.N. Charter arts. 52-53.
135. See CHRISTIAN CALLIESS ET AL., COALITION OF THE WILLING: AVANTGARDE OR
THREAT?(Christian Calliess, Georg Nolte & Peter-Tobias Stoll eds., Carl Heymanns Verlag
GmbH 2007).
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seems just and good"-and internationally lawful-"to [it], entirely independent of
the opinion of the others."The concern is most keenly felt in weak states, at once
vulnerable to external impositions and lacking any capacity to impose their sense
of justice on others. One might counter that it is only weak states' rulers who
regard such license as a danger and an affront, whereas the ruled-at least in
respect of impositions undertaken in the name of human rights law-would, or
should, welcome such impositions. That contention presupposes, however, higher-
than-evident levels of trust in, and trustworthiness of, the stronger actors, against
whose intervention even tyrannical rulers of weak states can frequently mobilize
opposition.
At the same time, even the powerful states, knowing that they are not trusted,
have a long-term interest in averting both chaos and resentment that weighs against
asserting a broad license to engage in self-help in respect of matters within the
territory of foreign states. This commonality of interest between weak and strong
states, as well as among rival strong states, grounds an accommodation that
presumptively bars any actor, however righteous, from disregarding an inner core
of prerogatives and inviolabilities attendant to equal membership in the community
of states. Only an exceptional process, established by the community of states itself
and requiring an extraordinary concurrence of opinion, authorizes an override of
the system's default rules.
International law represents-not exclusively, to be sure, but vitally-an
accommodation among entities prone to conflict rooted, not only in competing
interests, but also in systematic and profound disagreement about justice. Political
conflict's much-lamented intractability is largely owing to its moral component;
contestants are least willing to back down from positions taken as a matter of
principle. Although human beings rarely disagree about the most fundamental
moral principles in the abstract (e.g., "murder is wrong"), they all too frequently
disagree about the application of those moral principles to unmediated struggles
over the terms of public order (e.g., "one person's terrorist is another's freedom
fighter"). While the specific configurations of contemporary international conflict
can be ascribed to historical contingencies of the "Westphalian" state system, the
animating tendency toward moral disagreement is endemic to the human condition.
In the absence of commonalities of substantive moral principle, participants in
the international community need to find common ground on a different plane. The
imperative to honor agreements-and other forms of accommodation on which
others are led to rely-is not reducible to a pragmatic concern of the "repeat
player" to maintain a reputation that will enable her to obtain cooperation on
subsequent "plays," but is a duty, owed to the community, to maintain an
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expectation of compliance with established institutions. Moreover, "honor" itself is
not without moral significance, as it reflects integrity and respect for the other. One
honors agreements made with the unjust, mostly because it is irresponsible to do
otherwise when morally important interests depend on maintaining one's own and
others' ability to trade on the convention of agreement in similar future contexts,
but also because treachery, even when employed against actors who are themselves
immoral, incurs a moral taint.
The point is not that considerations of extraordinary injustice, even unilaterally
conceived, may never override the duty to honor one's formal commitments. It is
that positive obligations may be morally binding even where they demand
forbearance from the single-minded pursuit of one's unilateral moral ends.
Whatever the exceptions, they do not swallow the rule.
Thus, however paradoxical it may seem, restraint on the pursuit of justice is not
only central to the mission of existing international law, but also central to any
sound theory of international political morality that pertains to the development of
international legal institutions. Unilateral impositions, deriving from a particular,
empowered conception of universal morality, are more likely to be the problem
than the solution. What Prosper Weil stated a quarter-century ago remains valid
today:
At a time when international society needs more than ever a normative order capable of
ensuring the peaceful coexistence, and cooperation in diversity, of equal and equally
sovereign entities, the waning of voluntarism in favor of the ascendancy of some,
neutrality in favor of ideology, positivity in favor of ill-defined values might well
destabilize the whole international normative system and turn it into an instrument that can
no longer serve its purpose.136
Interestingly, among human rights-oriented scholars, this argument has
considerable (though by no means universal) appeal as applied to unilateral threats
and uses of force, 137 and perhaps even to unilateral coercive economic measures
136. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.413,
423 (1983); cf Alfred Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga Omnes?, 35
NEW ENG. L. REv. 265, 280 (2001) ("To ignore the problems of 'standing' or to assert that
the rules already evident in international practice and codified in the positive law of the
United Nations Charter do not apply in the case of some selected atrocities by some
selected villains (but not to others), or that lawyers' and judges' views of 'law' can overrule
the political decisions of the leaders of the various communities that compose the
international community today, is much more than can be accepted by anybody truly
concerned with peace and justice.").
137. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Opposing the New Militarism, 2008:1 FOREIGN VOICES 5
(2008), available at
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such as secondary boycotts.1 38 Yet some of the same scholars who embrace
restraints on those categories of exertions by individual states or "coalitions of the
willing" appear to see national courts' exercises of extraordinary extraterritorial
jurisdiction, nullifications of the immunity of foreign officials, and creative
circumventions of nullum crimen sine lege as not only exempt from the pitfalls of
such unilateral executive measures, but actually as a peace-building and law-
developing alternative to such executive measures.
This is a fundamental mistake. Extraterritorial prosecution of foreign-state
actors and forcible impositions upon foreign political communities are both
conceptually and practically intertwined. Because the legal limitations on the two
derive from the same jurisprudential concept, the likely consequence of the
loosening of constraints in the former realm will be the erosion of constraints in the
latter.
International legal constraints on the use of force are predicated not on a
principle of non-violence, but on a principle of respect for a foreign state's
authority within its boundaries.' 39 To put the point colorfully, but without
substantive exaggeration, the right against coercive intervention is the right of
territorial political communities to be ruled by their own thugs and to fight their
civil wars in peace. It reflects a pluralism that self-consciously sacrifices one set of
genuine moral imperatives to another. It favors the creation and maintenance of a
stable platform for peaceful and respectful accommodation among territorial
political communities-which may be ruled, for the time being, by governments
bearing incompatible conceptions of political morality-over licensing unilateral
projections of power across borders in service of what might objectively be a just
cause. 140 Although considerations of human rights may ground episodic exceptions
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileld=495;
see also Jose Alvarez, Notes from the President: The Schizophrenias of R2P, 23:3 ASIL
NEWSLETTER (2007), http://www.asil.org/newsletter/president/pres07O927.html.
138. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.419, 430 (1996) (asserting "that (in time of peace) the
exercise of jurisdiction ... to impose a secondary boycott ... is contrary to international
law, because it seeks unreasonably to coerce conduct that takes place wholly outside of the
state purporting to exercise its jurisdiction to prescribe.").
139. See ROBERT JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT, supra note 9, at 368 ("[P]erhaps the most
fundamental [concern of modern international society] has been.., to confine religious and
ideological weltanschauungen within the territorial cages of national borders.").
140. "[W]hen contemplating military intervention, the United Nations (U.N.) usually has
preferred not to differentiate between just and unjust reasons to intervene. Instead, the
nations have favored treating all states as autonomous entities entitled to be left alone, and
doing so on grounds of maintaining international peace and order, rather than advancing
justice." Thomas M. Franck, Is Justice Relevant to the International Legal System?, 64
NOTRE DAME L.J. 645, 655, 945, 955 (1989).
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to the non-intervention norm, human rights do not constitute a general qualification
of the norm; rather, a state's right against dictatorial interferences in its internal
affairs presumptively withstands the state's own violations of international legal
norms, including human rights norms. 4 '
To the extent that extraterritorial jurisdiction licenses the vilification of foreign
state officials, it has the potential to undermine the platform that undergirds
peaceful and respectful international relations. International efforts to secure the
bases of human well-being routinely require the cooperation of political leaders to
whom significant human rights violations can be attributed. Even recourse to force,
both international and internal, must often be directed toward creating the
conditions for a compromise that will respect the honor of the opposing party,
notwithstanding the opponent's ruthless acts. Moreover, where ruthless acts have
been committed with substantial popular support, particular leaders cannot be
singled out for vilification without impugning underlying constituencies, thereby
further complicating efforts to establish cooperation going forward. These are
morally important reasons to forbear from the pursuit of retributive justice across
borders, even though countervailing considerations may outweigh them in a
limited set of circumstances.
Beyond being a general irritant to international relations, assertions of
prosecutorial authority over the acts of foreign states within their territory, if
routinized, can easily become an available tool for proponents of an antagonistic
foreign policy.142 Indictments could be used as a rationale for hardening the
government's position against a foreign state, 143 akin to the insistence that one
141. For detailed discussion of this point, see Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State
Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017, 1033-37 (2004).
142. No assurance should be drawn from the fact that such proponents have, up to now, opposed
international criminal justice. Should the new normative tendencies achieve dominance,
those favoring projections of power by strong states in the affairs of weak states will likely
adapt their rhetorical approach to exploit its possibilities. A historical precedent is the
Reagan Administration's remarkable shift from rejection to acceptance of human rights
rhetoric in the early 1980s, and its invocation of human rights rationales in support of
aggressive policies that preceded the rhetorical shift. See WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE: THE
AMERICAS WATCH REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 3-23
(Cynthia Brown ed., Pantheon Books 1985).
143. The U.S. indictment of Panamanian strongman Manuel Antonio Noriega, albeit for drug
trafficking rather than human rights-related offenses, illustrates this point. See, e.g., Jeff
Cohen & Mark Cook, How Television Sold the Panama Invasion, FAIRNESS & ACCURACY
IN REPORTING, Extra! Jan./Feb. 1990), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page = 1546.
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never negotiate with terrorists. 144 More broadly, extraterritorial prosecutions might
serve as a device to discredit advocates of a peaceful settlement, purporting to
reveal the fecklessness of those who counsel-or who have in earlier instances
counseled-restraint and compromise in the face of a certified evil. Instead of
serving as a rationale for discouraging aggressive responses, respect for
international legality may be invoked as a reason to take aggressive action. 145
Worst of all, a legal attribution of criminality to adverse regimes may tend to
present international institutions with enforcement demands that such institutions,
dependent on consensus among non-like-minded states, characteristically cannot
fulfill. At this fork in the road, where the international legal order's procedural
strictures are perceived to frustrate that same order's imperative substantive ends,
violations of use-of-force norms can be rationalized as implementing the true spirit
of international law. 146 Instead of furthering accountability in the exercise of
power, international criminal law may furnish a rationale to disparage and to flout
those international institutions and processes that are designed to hold powerful
states accountable.
International criminal justice must thus respect the inherent pluralism of the
international legal order, or else play a part in that order's erosion. 147 Respect for
strictures associated with the international rule of law, even at the expense of
substantive justice, safeguards that pluralistic order's foundations.
144. For an example of such reasoning, see generally Louis Ren6 Beres, International Law
Requires Prosecution, Not Celebration, of Arafat, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 569 (1994).
145. See generally GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (elaborating
the historical tendency of the international system to cast particular states as non-right-
bearing outlaws).
146. Such invocation of universal principles in the face of institutional deadlock is brilliantly
exemplified in Reisman, Unilateral Actions, supra note 13, at 14-15. That model of
argumentation was arguably decisive in winning over important liberal constituencies to the
Bush Administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
147. The reasons given above may be taken as arguments against state consent to further
expansion of universal jurisdiction, or as arguments for forbearance from prosecutions that
have a valid basis in existing international criminal law. Both of those questions are beyond
the scope of this article. For present purposes, the point is that gaps in the positive
criminalization of human rights violations result, not from some technical failure to have
accomplished an unquestioned goal, but instead from countervailing considerations that
ground continued resistance within the international community to an expansive license for
extraterritorial prosecution. Consequently, courts have a responsibility to respect existing
limitations, rather than to seek a work-around.
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V. International Legality and the Criminalization of Ordinary
Human Rights Violations
The international rule of law, in turn, is predicated on respect for states'
presumptive monopoly of the last word on public order inside their respective
territories. Although that monopoly no longer applies in respect to established
international crimes, it continues to withstand violations of international
obligations in general-including human rights obligations. 
14 8
The establishment of an international crime requires a separate step, over and
149
above the establishment of an international human rights norm. 9 Justice Geoffrey
Robertson of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has articulated the crucial requisite
for this second step as follows:
There must be evidence (or at least inference) of general agreement by the international
community that breach of the customary law rule would or would now, entail international
criminal liability for individual perpetrators, in addition to the normative obligation on
States to prohibit the conduct in question under their domestic law ... [I]t must be clear
that the overwhelming preponderance of states, courts, conventions, jurists and so forth
relied upon to crystallize the international law "norm" intended- or now intend-this rule
to have penal consequences for individuals brought before international courts, whether or
not such a court presently exists with jurisdiction over them. 15
0
148. "He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under
international law." International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
supra note 7, at 221. However, these attributions of individual liability for participation in
state acts typically occur where "the acts were crimes against international law, so it is
doubtful whether they apply to breaches of international law which are not crimes against
international law." Akehurst, supra note 68, at 243.
149. As the ICTY has noted, "For criminal liability to attach, it is not sufficient ... merely to
establish that the act in question was illegal under international law, in the sense of being
liable to engage the responsibility of a state which breaches that prohibition, nor is it
enough to establish that the act in question was a crime under the domestic law of the
person who committed the act." Prosecutor v. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment,
. 196, 199 (Nov. 29, 2002), cited in Van Schaack, supra note 30, at 150 n. 139, 199. For
example, the ICTY has held that for a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 to qualify, the violation "must constitute a breach of a rule protecting
important values," "must involve grave consequences for the victim," and "must entail,
under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person
breaching the rule." Prosecutor v. Tadi6, supra note 75, 94 ... However, as Van Schaack
has pointed out, the ICTY's practice on this point has been more equivocal than this
rhetoric suggests. Van Schaack, supra note 30, at 154-57.
150. Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Judgment on
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 31 Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Robertson, 17, 21 (May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Norman, Robertson
Dissent], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,SCSL,,,49abc0a22,0.html.
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In the illustrative case of Sam Hinga Norman, Robertson's dissent asserted an
insufficiency of evidence, regarding the international norm prohibiting enlistment
of children in armed forces, that "by 1996 it was intended by the international
community to be a criminal law prohibition for the breach of which individuals
should be arrested and punished."' 5' Whether or not his assessment of the evidence
was correct in that case, 15 his criterion expresses the essence of nullum crimen
sine lege as applied to international criminal law.
In the absence of an established international crime, state sovereignty, rather
than being straightforwardly displaced by international legal obligation, retains a
residual presence alongside international legal obligation. Paradoxical though it
may seem, renunciation of a practice does not, in itself, entail renunciation of the
legal capacity to authorize that practice. Schmitt's notorious maxim, "Sovereign is
he who decides on the exception,"'' 53 while debatable in application to domestic
legal orders, captures the essence of the relationship between domestic and
international authority wherever an international crime has not been authoritatively
established: states, as represented by the recognized governments, retain the legal
capacity (even though not the right) to authorize measures in violation of the
state's ordinary international legal obligations. 54 In so acting, states incur
responsibility for breach, and render themselves susceptible to adverse legal
consequences, including the (appropriately limited) countermeasures of specially
affected states or of the community of states. 55  However, the cluster of
constraining norms discussed above-limits to extraterritorial jurisdiction,
immunity ratione materiae, and nullum crimen sine lege-shields from personal
liability officials and cooperating citizens operating inside their own national
territory within domestic legal mandates. Intemationally-acknowledged sovereign
The majority opinion did not overtly depart from Robertson's criteria. See Prosecutor v.
Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Judgment on Preliminary Motion
Based on Lack of 31 Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 37 [hereinafter Norman, Majority
Opinion] (citing Prosecutor v. Tadi6, supra note 75, on "[s]tate practice indicating an
intention to criminalize the prohibition...").
151. Norman, Majority Opinion, supra note 150, 20, 37; Norman, Robertson Dissent, supra
note 150, at 21.
152. For the contrary assessment, see Norman, Majority Opinion, supra note 150, %7 44-51.
153. SCHMITT, supra note 57, at 5.
154. "International law ... recognizes the power-though not the right-to break a treaty and
abide the international consequences." Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION t68 (Foundation Press 1972).
155. Int'l Law Comm'n, Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 48-54 (2001), in JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (Cambridge Univ. Press
2002).
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prerogative thus operates to protect individuals who act-albeit in an
internationally wrongful manner- in the state's service.
This rule applies even to norms that might plausibly be categorized as jus
cogens.1 5 6 Notwithstanding the indications of much scholarly commentary'57 and
some judicial dicta, 158 a norm'sjus cogens status does not alone establish universal
penal jurisdiction or the voiding of immunities. 159 Jus cogens norms do have
156. Jus cogens refers to a "peremptory" norm, "accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 53.
157. One source of confusion in this area is that some important scholars have popularized the
term "lus cogens crimes." See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for International
Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International Crimes: Jus
Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996); Leila Nadya
Sadat, Exile, Amnesty, and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 955, 966 & n.31
(2006). These scholars use that term to highlight claims about additional legal consequences
(such as the purported inadmissibility of amnesty) of certain acts that have been established
to incur international criminal liability. Whatever the merit of those claims, the rhetoric has
had the effect of leading less careful scholars to conflate jus cogens and international
crimes-phenomena that do, of course, frequently coincide. See Bartram S. Brown, The
Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383, 392-93 (2001)
(cautioning against the over-identification ofjus cogens with universal jurisdiction).
Moreover, the rhetoric ofjus cogens crimes tends to present as settled what is, in actuality,
a highly contentious assertion: that the duty of states to prosecute foreign-state officials for
crimes of this nature is itself a jus cogens obligation that overrides constraining
international legal norms of a "lower" status. A prohibition's jus cogens status does not, in
itself, imply the same status for the obligation to prosecute the offense. See W. N.
FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL
COURTS 182 (T.M.C. Asser Press 2006); Shany, supra note 84, at 867. Indeed, the
International Criminal Court Statute seems to counter-indicate jus cogens status for such
prosecutorial obligations, since its call for surrender of suspects expressly yields to states
parties' contrary treaty obligations to non-parties. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 17,
art. 98.
158. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furund;ija, supra note 32, 147, 155-156.
159. See, e.g., FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 157, at 182; Shany, supra note 84, at 867; Andrea
Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic ofJus Cogens, 19 EURO J. INT'L L. 491, 500 (2008).
Several important recent decisions have, in the face of allegedjus cogens violations, upheld
state immunity, the immunity ratione personae of sitting state officials responsible for
diplomacy, and the immunity ratione materiae of state officials in civil cases. See Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belgium (Yerodia), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. C.J. 3
(Feb. 2002) (upholding the immunity ratione personae of a currently serving Foreign
Minister from prosecution in a foreign-state court for crimes against humanity); Al-Adsani
v. Government of Kuwait (No. 2), 107 I.L.R. 536 (1996 ILR 536) (House of Lords holding
that state immunity precludes civil suits against foreign states for torture); Jones v. Ministry
of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006) U.K.H.L. 26 (House of Lords
holding that state immunity precludes civil suits against foreign officials for torture, even
though those officials are subject to criminal liability); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273 (2001) (a closely divided decision of the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, holding that human rights law does not
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important special characteristics that imply an element of "normative hierarchy": 
160
these norms, unlike ordinary customary norms, are obligatory notwithstanding the
"persistent objection" of any individual state to their formation; 161 they admit of no
"circumstances precluding wrongfulness" of their violation; 162 and they limit the
permissible content of treaties. 163 However, while the international system will not
recognize any ill-gotten gains from ajus cogens violation,164 it has not (at least, so
far) established that a governmental act, simply by virtue of being taken in breach
of ajus cogens obligation, is ultra vires of state authority.
165
require a state court to void foreign state immunity in civil suits for torture). As Hazel Fox
has put it, state immunity "does not contradict a prohibition contained in ajus cogens norm
but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement. Arguably, then, there
is no substantive content in the procedural plea of State immunity upon which a jus cogens
mandate can bite." HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 525 (Oxford University
Press 2002).
160. See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291
(2006).
161. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 186 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1999).
162. Int'l Law Comm'n, Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 155, arts. 20-26, 50(1)(d)
(peremptory norms preclude invocations of consent, self-defense, countermeasures, force
majeure, distress, and necessity).
163. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 53.
164. It is true that "No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by" a "gross or
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfill" a peremptory obligation, nor may it
"render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation." Int'l Law Comm'n, Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 155, arts. 40-41. However, these unlawful situations "virtually
without exception" involve "legal claims to territory." Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory opinion, 2004 I.C.J
Rep.C.J. 36, 43-44 (July 9) (Kooijmans, J., separate opinion); see generally, Stefan
Talmon, The Duty Not to "Recognize as Lawful" a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of
Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Norm, in FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 99-125
(Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2006). The provision
thus appears to be little more than a restatement of the "Stimson Doctrine," adopted in the
1930s in response to the Japanese use of force to create the satellite state of Manchukuo.
See, e.g., HOWARD JONES, CRUCIBLE OF POWER: A HISTORY OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
SINCE 1897 129 (SR Books 2001). Such non-recognition follows directly from the U.N.
Charter scheme, and entails no innovations.
165. W. Michael Reisman reports (with no indication of either endorsement or disavowal):
In human rights discourse, jus cogens has acquired a much more radical meaning [than
that contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties], evolving into a type of
super-custom, based on trans-empirical sources and hence not requiring demonstration of
practice as proof of its validity. This new understanding ofjus cogens renders national
law that is inconsistent with it devoid of intemational and national legal effect, such that
national officials who purport to act on the putative authority of that national law may
now incur direct international responsibility.
Reisman, Unilateral Actions and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process:
The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 13, at 15 n. 29. In reality,
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Nothing logically compels the step from a norm's supremacy within the
international system to the international system's denial of legal recognition to all
domestic authority shielding state agents from personal liability for breach. 16 6 As
the International Law Commission has noted, "the category of international
obligations admitting of no derogation is much broader than the category of
obligations whose breach is necessarily an international crime. Too close an
assimilation of the two notions may be an attractive simplification, but it does not
appear to be conceptually acceptable."'
167
This is the essential reason why, in the case of Chilean ex-dictator Augusto
Pinochet, the ultimate decision of the British House of Lords found susceptibility
to prosecution abroad only for those acts of torture committed after the Torture
Convention came into force for Chile. 168 Even though the decision acknowledged
torture to have been a violation of customary international law, and indeed a
violation ofjus cogens, long before the treaty's effective date, an exemption from
immunity was effected only upon the positive establishment of universal
jurisdiction over foreign-state officials operating inside their national territory and
within official capacity.' 69 In the wake of the Torture Convention and state
"in most ... cases where peremptory norms have been recognized, the legal consequences
of this classification were essentially imperceptible." Shelton, supra note 160, at 306.
166. This proposition would entail, among other things, the "Chanler thesis," which asserted that
Wehrmacht soldiers participating in their state's unlawful offensive uses of force lacked
combatant privilege and could thus be susceptible to prosecution for their combat violence
as domestic crime. See TAYLOR, supra note 124, at 37. A similar idea was conveyed in the
first (3 votes to 2) House of Lords decision on the immunities of former Chilean Head of
State Augusto Pinochet; according to Lord Nicholls (joined by Lords Steyn and Hoffman),
"it hardly needs saying that torture of his own subjects, or of aliens, would not be regarded
by international law as a function of a head of state... This was made clear long before
1973 and the events which took place in Chile then and thereafter." Regina v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (Pinochet I), 1 A.C. 61, 109 (2000); cf id. at 115 (Lord
Steyn, opinion); id. at 118 (Lord Hoffman, opinion). In the ultimate judgment, however, at
most two of seven Law Lords (Lord Millett and apparently Lord Phillips) embraced this
view. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (Pinochet III), 1 A.C. 147
(2000).
167. Int'l Law Comm'n, Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19, 1 62
(1996), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/ILCSR/rft/Srl9.rtf; see also BYERS,
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, supra note 161, at 184-185 n. 95.
168. An additional reason concerned the principle of "double-criminality" in British extradition
law-i.e., the need for British law, as well as Spanish law, to have established torture as a
universal jurisdiction crime-but that aspect of the holding was not predicated on an
interpretation of international law. See Pinochet III, supra note 166, at 189 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, opinion).
169. The lead opinion made the point as follows:
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practices pursuant and parallel to it, official torture by now likely constitutes a
universal-jurisdiction crime under customary international law as well, but this was
not clearly so with respect to earlier periods (including, regrettably, the mid- 1970s,
when the bulk of the Chilean atrocities took place).
Beth Van Schaack has nonetheless discerned a tendency in international
tribunals to elide the distinction between international obligations and international
crimes, and thus between state responsibility and individual culpability. She
observes that, for example, the ICTY has imputed individual criminal
responsibility even with respect to Geneva norms that fall outside of the
Conventions' "grave breaches" regime. 170 Yet it is important to note that even
Justice Robertson's positivistic approach to nullum crimen sine lege does not
exclude subsequent attributions of penal responsibility to initially non-penal
norms, so long as patterns of state practice and manifestations of opinio juris
properly evidence an authoritative decision of the international community to this
effect. Positivism insists that a norm's legal validity derives from its social source
rather than its moral content;1 71 it does not limit cognizable sources to treaties and
legislation.
More troubling is Van Schaack's observation that "T[t]ribunals have reasoned
that, when conduct shocks the conscience of the international community, no
formal notice of its penal consequences is necessary to prosecute offenders."
'1 72
Insofar as "no formal notice" here means dispensing with the need, not merely for
official promulgation, but for the positive establishment of crimes on ground of the
acts being mala in se, 173 this directly contradicts Robertson's orthodox position,
which he articulates with eloquence as follows:
I have doubts whether, before the coming into force of the Torture Convention, the
existence of the international crime of torture as jus cogens was enough to justify the
conclusion that the organization of state torture could not rank for immunity purposes as
an official function. At that stage there was no international tribunal to punish torture and
no general jurisdiction to permit or require its punishment in domestic courts. Not until
there was some form of universal jurisdiction for the punishment of the crime of torture
could it really be talked about as a fully constituted international crime. But in my
judgment the Torture Convention did provide what was missing: a worldwide universal
jurisdiction.
Pinochet III, supra note 166, at 204-05 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, opinion).
170. Van Schaack, supra note 30, at 154, 155 n. 162 ("While 'grave breaches' must be
prosecuted and punished by all States, 'other' breaches of the Geneva Conventions may be
so.") (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., supra note 66, at 176).
171. Gardner, supra note 34, at 199.
172. Van Schaack, supra note 30, at 156.
173. Van Schaack cites, for example, this characteristically equivocal language from the ICTY
Appeals Chamber: "Although the immorality or appalling character of an act is not a
sufficient factor to warrant its criminalization under customary international law, it may in
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Here, the Prosecution asserts with some insouciance that "the principle of nullem crimen
sine lege is not in any case applied rigidly, particularly where the acts in question are
universally regarded as abhorrent and deeply shock the conscience of humanity." On the
contrary, it is precisely when the acts are abhorrent and deeply shocking that the principle
of legality must be most stringently applied, to ensure that a defendant is not convicted out
of disgust rather than evidence, or of a non-existent crime. Nullem crimen may not be a
household phrase, but it serves as some protection against the lynch mob. 
174
Although Robertson's endorsement of the moral significance of positive law is
stirring, it needs some qualification. Rigidity in this field is a virtue, not for its own
sake, but because it responds to a vital moral interest. The problem is not that it is
wrong to prosecute "conduct that shocks the conscience of the international
community"; the problem is that it is too easy so to characterize the conduct of
disfavored actors.'
75
Where individuals commit ruthless acts on behalf of political causes to which
one is unsympathetic or indifferent, the acts "shock the conscience." Where the
acts are thought to be necessary expedients in the service of a compelling societal
end, they turn out not to be so shocking, after all. 176 The hypothesized conscience
fact play a role in that respect, insofar as it may refute any claim by the Defence that it did
not know of the criminal nature of the acts." Van Schaack, supra note 30, at 156 (quoting
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, § 42 (May 21, 2003)).
174. See Norman, Robertson Dissent, supra note 150, 12 (footnote omitted).
175. The Norman case itself was by no means as morally clear-cut as Justice Robertson's
formalistic argument suggests. The defendant led the Sierra Leone Civil Defense Force
against a rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), notorious for the grotesquerie
of its mass atrocities. See Michael Nesbitt, Lessons from the Sam Hinga Norman Decision
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: How Trials and Truth Commissions Can Co-exist -
Part 1/2, 8:10 GERMAN L.J. 977 (2007), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=866. Not only was Norman widely
regarded as a hero in Sierra Leone, but given the dire moral consequences of defeat in that
conflict, it is hardly clear that enlisting child soldiers to maximize his force's fighting
capacity was truly, in its context, shocking to the conscience. One might imagine that a
village in danger of being overrun by the RUF would sooner muster its children to the
collective defense than leave its children at the mercy of the marauders. This
consequentialist argument is inadmissible in the presence of a firmly established and strict
penal norm, but to the extent that the penal standard is being improvised by appeal to moral
consensus, the point can hardly be considered immaterial.
176. Some supporters of the Bush Administration have contended that United States
constitutional jurisprudence governing cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment prohibits-as "conscience-shocking"--only "conduct intended to injure in
some way unjustifiable by any government interest." Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,
775 (2003). Although this is probably a somewhat misleading account of the constitutional
doctrine, the doctrine plausibly establishes a sliding scale, which evaluates harsh measures
differentially in light of varying governmental needs.
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of the international community is deontological; the empirical conscience of the
international community, I submit, 77 is consequentialist. The ends of the "good
guys" are widely perceived to justify their means; acts undertaken to further the
cause of the "bad guys" are inevitably viewed less charitably. In an international
system that reconciles a wide-ranging (though not unlimited) plurality of political
moralities, it is dangerous to make generalizations about specific measures that
"shock the conscience" irrespective of their political justifications. Universal-
jurisdiction-based prosecutions that could proceed by appeals to conscience would
inevitably generate widely varying results, depending on the political sympathies
prevalent in the venue.
The global system's pluralism is, above all, a pluralism of conflicting
consequentialist moralities. There is typically no dispute about the presumptive
wrongfulness of the acts in question. Indeed, inasmuch as these are acknowledged
as human rights violations, there is no legally cognizable dispute that the wrong
suffered by the victims cannot simply be cancelled out by a countervailing social
benefit.1 78 There is nonetheless, frequent dispute as to whether, in particular cases,
exceptional circumstances justify inflicting the wrong upon that set of victims,
dispute that typically reflects differential regard for the conceptions of legitimate
and just public order that underlie the claims of justification.179
The system's default position is that a state retains the sovereign capacity to
authorize the act, thereby taking collective responsibility for the violation and
shielding state agents from personal liability. Only where the international
community of states comes to acknowledge the violation as an international crime
is the state deemed to have renounced this sovereign capacity.
This step occurs most often with respect to those measures-for example,
genocide, crimes against humanity, and gross or systematic violations of the laws
and customs of war- that, far from being substantially related to cognizable
governmental ends, entail or suggest, by their very nature, either rogue activity or
ends that the international community has authoritatively repudiated (such as
177. See Brad R. Roth, State Sovereignty, International Legality, and Moral Disagreement, in
THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 123, 151-161 (Tomer
Broude & Yuval Shany eds., Hart Publishing Co. 2008).
178. On "uncancelled wrongs" from the standpoint of moral philosophy, see STEVEN LUKES,
MORAL CONFLICT AND POLITICS 192-93 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
179. The philosophical aspects of these disputes are too complex to cover in this space. For
present purposes, it is enough to notice the sociological aspects. A ready illustration can be
found in the vituperative disputes that rage among liberal intellectuals who sympathize,
respectively, with the Israeli and Palestinian causes. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam,
Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law: Vindication of International Justice or Pursuit of
Politics?, 25 CoRDOzO L. REV. 247 (2003).
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"ethnic cleansing"). The phenomenon has extended, typically by express consent,
to other specific measures as well (including, for example, torture and the use of
chemical weapons), but the international community, as it stands currently, is very
far from having sweepingly criminalized state recourse to ruthless means.'
80
Whereas human rights norms should be read expansively to realize their object
and purpose, international penal norms need to be read narrowly as derogations of
affirmative legal limitations.' 81 It would be highly distortive to transplant the
expansive logic of human rights protection-appropriate to the use of law as a
shield-to the very different task of identifying candidates for international
vilification.' 82 The problem is all the worse where state agents' status as "enemies
of humanity" will be left open, through the removal of immunity ratione materiae,
to determinations by those adverse to the governmental ends for which the ruthless
means were invoked.
Yet, as Darryl Robinson, has noted,
a technique commonly used in ICL is (i) to adopt a purposive interpretive approach; (ii) to
assume that the exclusive object and purpose of an ICL enactment is to maximize victim
protection; and (iii) to allow this presumed object and purpose to dominate over other
considerations, including if necessary the text itself.
183
Such an approach might be tolerable in the service of giving full effect to an
international consensus that was real and manifest to the perpetrator at the time of
the conduct, even if the requisite articulations of opinio juris lagged somewhat
behind. But insofar as it would give effect to illusory consensus, and license
partisan judgments in the name of universality, it would offend considerations
fundamental to the international rule of law.
International penal norms represent the limits of a qualified pluralism. They
place certain acts and actors beyond the pale, while otherwise leaving in place an
agreement to disagree, not merely about peripheral matters, but about matters of
180. For greater elaboration on this point, see Roth, Just Short of Torture, supra note 20, at 232-
34.
181. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 31(3)(c) (indicating that
treaty interpretation must take into account "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties").
182. And indeed, the need for the distinction cuts both ways. Were all breaches of human rights
obligations to be regarded ipso facto as international crimes, it would follow logically, but
perversely, that any practice that is not an international crime is not a breach of state
obligation. To interpret the standard restrictively, as appropriate, where the focus is on the
wrongdoing of the perpetrator, would then have the effect of diluting the standard of state
obligation toward the victim.
183. Robinson, supra note 2, at 934.
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freedom and tyranny, life and death. By observing positivistic standards in
discerning the reach of international penal norms, jurists implement whatever
overlapping consensus and compromise have been established among bearers of
differing moral sensibilities. In this way, they avoid exaggerations of the scope of
accord, exaggerations well suited to the pursuit of a partisan agenda.
Conclusion
The foregoing article intends a radical statement, albeit in service of a set of
moderate prescriptions. The target of that statement is not international criminal
law as it has generally operated in practice, but the exuberant rhetoric that has
frequently accompanied that practice. The sweeping promise to "end impunity" for
human rights violations should be a source of anxiety rather than enthusiasm, for it
may well portend, not predictability and accountability in the exercise of power,
but rather quite the opposite. To romanticize penal processes as holding
perpetrators accountable to victims obscures their more typical tendency to hold
the losers of political conflicts accountable to the winners. Human rights
advocates, of all people, should think twice before identifying with winners as
against losers, and before engaging in advocacy that may conveniently aid in
legitimating the impositions of the powerful. 
184
Nullum crimen sine lege and related doctrines that limit extraterritorial
jurisdiction and confer immunity ratione materiae are not inconvenient obstacles
to be circumvented, but crucial safeguards to be respected. These doctrines
respond to the reality that the international community remains beset by serious
moral disagreement, both about what count as just ends and about which harsh
measures those ends might justify in circumstances of high-stakes political
conflict. In such a world, in which very few hands are truly clean, unilateral
invocations of universal principles must be viewed skeptically, and associated
exercises of power treated guardedly. Prosecutions undertaken in the name of the
international community must establish a requisite social, and not merely a moral,
184. Darryl Robinson astutely points out the potential misfit between a "human rights
liberalism" that views such international criminal cases from the standpoint of the
prosecution, and a "criminal law liberalism" that views them from the standpoint of the
defense. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 93 1. But it remains disconcerting that human rights
advocates should identify with prosecutorial authority, or for that matter, with the winning
side of political conflicts. This may be attributable to a peculiar historical moment, with
views having been forged by the experience of an extraordinary series of relatively peaceful
transitions from authoritarian to liberal regimes. This author's more pessimistic frame of
mind reflects the influence of a different set of historical episodes, and a self-conscious
identification with losers, rather than winners, of political conflict.
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basis for condemning acts-including acknowledged human rights violations-as
crimes, and for holding their state-authorized perpetrators as subject to individual
penal responsibility.
An over-assertive approach to international criminal justice, to be pursued
unilaterally in domestic justice systems, is troubling because it risks undermining
what is arguably most valuable about international law. International law provides
a framework for accommodation among the non-like-minded, and a normative
basis for mobilizing broad opposition to the self-righteous violence of the powerful
(even as it licenses uses of force where there is genuinely no reasonable
alternative). Penal processes aim to identify villains, consequently to exclude them
as bearers of recognized authority, and thus as partners in negotiation and
accommodation. Appropriate though such outcomes are in an important subset of
circumstances, it is dangerous to distract from the deeper truth that peace means
peace with others as they are, not as we might like for them to be. One must seek
peace, not always with the gentle, but often with the ruthless. A repudiation of that
truth risks setting in motion, willy-nilly, a new ruthlessness to end all ruthlessness.
